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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with Freud's (1900/1967, p. 284, foot-
note) reference to Poetzl's (1917/1960) study of the role 
of unnoticed stimuli in dream formation, many psycho-
analysts have viewed subliminal perception as an important 
research method. For example, Klein (1959, 1967) used the 
method to investigate the differential effects of periph~ 
eral versus focal awareness of stimuli and ideas. Here, 
inputting stimuli at subliminal levels was viewed as a 
means to manipulate peripheral trains of thought. Pine 
(1964) noted that in many studies, the effect of a sub-
liminal stimulus was often indirectly or symbolically re-
lated to the stimulus content. These transformations of 
subliminal stimuli were thought to result from primary 
process thinking (i.e., use of condensation, symboliza-
tion, and displacement). For these authors, subliminal 
perception was seen as a powerful tool for studying cog-
nitive processes hypothesized to occur at unconscious or 
preconscious levels. 
More recently, Lloyd Silverman and his associates 
at New York University have published over 25 studies 
(summarized in Silverman, 1976) using a laboratory tech-
1 
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nique termed "subliminal psychodynamic activation." These 
studies typically present some wish- or conflict-related 
stimulus at subliminal levels and compare its effect on 
behavior to that of some (relatively) neutral stimulus. 
Relationships between particular unconscious conflicts and 
psychopathologies hypothesized by psychoanalysts have been 
investigated with this method. For example, Silverman and 
Silverman (1967) found that subliminal presentation of 
stimuli containing aggressive content resulted in increases 
in measured thought disorder in a group of schizophrenics. 
Predicted results have also been obtained with groups of 
depressives (Rutstein & Goldberger, 1973), stutterers 
(Silverman, Klinger, Lustbader, Farrel, & Martin, 1972), 
homosexual males (Silverman, Kwawer, Wolitzky, & Coren, 
1973), insect phobics (Silverman, Frank, & Dachinger, 
1974) and overweight women {Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & 
Mendelsohn, 1978) • In a review of his work, Silverman 
{1976) concludes that the results offer strong support for 
the psychoanalytic notion that conflicts occurring below 
awareness can account for many specific symptomatologies. 
Given the complexity of many of the stimuli used and the 
wide range of behavioral effects observed, these results 
are not easily explained by most current theories of visual 
information processing {e.g., Neisser, 1967). 
Despite a prodigious outpouring of supportive re-
search from Silverman's laboratory, the few independent 
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replications of his work found in the literature have ob-
tained disappointing results (Greenberg, 1977; Emmelkamp 
& Straatman, 1976). In an attempt to encourage replica-
tion and to demonstrate the effects of the method on a 
type of behavior not previously studied, Silverman, Ross, 
Adler and Lustig (1978) report results of four experiments 
using a relatively simple methodology and college males as 
subjects. The major intention of each experiment was to 
manipulate, through subliminal presentation of conflict-
related material, the degree of oedipal conflict in the 
subjects and to observe the effects of this on subjects' 
accuracy in dart-throwing competition. Thus, the study 
purports to test the psychoanalytic proposition that males 
can unconsciously inhibit themselves in competitive per-
formance because winning has the hidden connotation of 
defeating father for mother's love (Beisser, 1961). 
In an attempted replication of the major parts of 
this study, Swanson (Note 1) obtained results that were 
quite different from those of the original study. For 
this author, exposure to the BEATING DAD IS OK stimulus 
led to no significant change in subjects' dart scores, 
while exposure to BEATING DAD IS WRONG led to significant 
increases, a finding in the opposite direction of that ob-
tained by the original authors. 
The present investigation includes a further rep-
lication of this study using the two BEATING DAD stimuli 
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in the dart-throwing paradigm. An additional control group 
receives identical treatment except that the "priming" pro-
cedures used in the earlier studies are omitted. The re-
sults bear on Silverman's (1965) assertion regarding the 
necessity of these procedures for normal subjects and on 
the more general issue of the role of drive activation in 
subliminal perception research (e.g., Klein & Holt, 1960). 
Additional personality and historical data is collected 
in order to more systematically evaluate the importance of 
subject differences for this paradigm. In particular, 
subjects are asked about their religious history, as this 
may in part determine meanings given to the words "ok," 
"wrong," and "dad." Subjects are also asked the word they 
use to refer to their fathers. These data may shed light 
on the relevance of idiosyncratic and associative meanings 
given to stimulus words. Finally, personality inventory 
data is collected in order to explore identifiable per-
sonality differences associated with subliminal effect in 
the dart paradigm. 
Studies of subliminal perception have often ob-
tained weak or ambiguous results and have only rarely 
been replicated (for reviews, see Dixon, 1971; Wolitzky & 
Wachtel, 1973; Swanson, Note 1}. One possible reason for 
the apparent fragility of subliminal effects is that the 
stimulus contents used in many experiments may be insuf-
ficient in their emotional impact and so have negligible 
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effect on primary process or non-conscious mental events. 
In addition, many studies have been criticized for em-
ploying dependent measures insensitive to the subtle ef-
fects of subliminal stimulation on peripheral trains of 
thought (Klein, 1967). The second part of the present 
investigation addresses itself to these criticisms by in-
cluding stimuli with highly aggressive content and employ-
ing word association tasks as dependent measures. 
Following the replication procedures discussed 
above, subjects are subliminally exposed to the verbal 
stimulus DESTROY FATHER and pictorial stimulus of a younger 
male attacking an older male figure. Subsequent word as-
sociations are compared to those following subliminal 
presentations of the (relatively) neutral verbal stimulus 
PEOPLE WALKING and associated pictoral stimulus. Follow-
ing Silverman (1976) , it is hypothesized here that the 
highly aggressive stimuli will arouse unconscious conflict 
reflected by disturbances in subjects' associative pro-
cesses. In both these and replication procedures, stimulus 
order is randomized and the experimenter blind to stimulus 
content. Finally, each subject completes a discrimination 
task using experimental stimuli as a check on the avail-
ability of supraliminal partial cues. 
In order to place Silverman's research program in 
historical perspective, earlier studies using the sublim-
inal perception paradigm to test various psychoanalytic 
6 
propositions are reviewed in the following section. 
Studies using word association as a dependent measure are 
given special attention. This is followed by a summary of 
methodological and theoretical criticisms of the paradigm 
and a critical review of Silverman's work. Methods and 
results of the current study are presented in subsequent 
sections. Finally, results are discussed as they bear on 
issues in subliminal perception research (particularly 
Silverman's program), visual information processing, and 
psychoanalytic personality theory. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
Dixon (1971) has traced the notion of subliminal 
perception to the writings of Democritus, Plato, and 
Aristotle. Systematic research is generally considered to 
have begun with Suslowa's (1863; cited by Wolitzky & 
Wachtel, 1973) study of the effects of weak electrical 
stimulation upon the two-point threshold, and Pierce and 
Jastrow's (1884; cited by Dixon, 1971) findings that sub-
jects judged weights at a better than chance rate even 
when they expressed no subjective confidence in their 
judgments. Guided by Freud's notion of the role of day 
residue in dream formation, Poetzl (1917/1960) published 
an important study in which subjects were exposed to pic-
tures of landscapes tachistoscopically and asked to draw 
and describe what they had seen. Parts of the stimulus 
that were unnoticed following tachistoscopic exposure fre-
quently appeared in the content of subjects' dreams later 
that night. Except for replications of Poetzl's study by 
Malamud and Linder (1931) and Allers and Telers (1924/ 
1960), little was published in the area until the 1950s. 
The voluminous literature on subliminal perception 
published since that time can be divided into three main 
7 
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lines of investigation (Wolitzky & Wachtel, 1973) • The 
first line of research, usually undertaken within the 
orientation of psychophysics or signal detection theory, 
attempts to determine the information-processing limits of 
the perceptual apparatus. Bevan's (1964) experiments on 
the effect of subliminal anchors upon psychophysical 
judgments are typical of this research. A second line 
has grown from the classical conditioning paradigm. These 
studies usually look at verbal conditioning without aware-
ness, focusing largely on establishing experimental ana-
logues of therapeutically effective learning (e.g., 
Greenspoon, 1955; Spielberger, 1962). These two areas of 
research have been periodically reviewed (Adams, 1957; 
McConnell, Cutler, & McNeil, 1958; Bevan, 1964; Dixon, 197l) 
and so will not be considered here. 
The third line of research stems largely from "New 
Look 11 approaches to perception. Beginning with McGinnies 
(1949) report that taboo words had elevated recognition 
thresholds compared to other words, many studies followed 
which investigated the relationship between perception and 
personality processes. Much of this research was guided by 
psychoanalytic notions of preconscious and unconscious 
thinking, primary and secondary process thinking, and con-
flict and defense. For example, recent work by Erdelyi and 
Kleinbard (1978) and Erdelyi and Goldberg (1979) bears on 
psychoanalytic notions of repression and the retrievability 
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of lost ("unconscious") memories. 
Among New Look investigations using a subliminal 
perception paradigm, perhaps the theoretical and empirical 
work of George Klein (1959, 1967) is most significant. 
Klein (1970) was interested in the issue of the differen-
tial effects of peripheral versus focal awareness of stim-
uli and ideas. He proposed the model of "schema activa-
tion" (Klein & Holt, 1960) by which subliminal or inciden-
tal inputs are likely to activate drive-related ideas and 
lead to behavioral effects under certain subject and stim-
ulus conditions. As will be seen, Silverman's (1976) 
recent work on "subliminal psychodynamic activation" ap-
pears closely related to ideas advanced by.- Klein. Before 
considering Silverman's research program however, a partial 
review of studies using the subliminal perception paradigm 
to test various psychoanalytic hypotheses, an examination 
of studies involving word association, and a consideration 
of methodological and theoretical criticisms of the para-
digm are advanced. 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Subliminal 
Perception Research 
As Pine (1964) notes, a major reason for interest 
in the effects of subliminal or incidental (outside focal 
awareness) stimuli has been the hope that this research 
would permit controlled study of thought processes operating 
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outside of awareness. Much of the research was guided by 
the notions of primary and secondary process thinking and 
the role of day residue in dream formation advanced by 
Freud (1900/1967, Chapter VII). In order to study the 
workings of these hypothesized processes, several different 
methods for presenting stimuli have been used. In some 
studies (e.g., Pine, 1961), the critical stimuli are pre-
sented at above threshold intensities, while the subjects' 
attention is diverted to a separate focal task. As stimuli 
are not presented at a level below an independently deter-
mined threshold, this method is more properly termed "in-
cidental" stimulation (see Dixon, 1971, for further discus-
sion). Other studies (e.g., Klein, Spence, Holt, & 
Gourevitch, 1958) have used a backward masking method in-
volving brief exposure of one (A) stimulus immediately 
followed by exposure to another (B) stimulus which is 
supraliminal. The effect of the unreported A-stimulus on 
subjects' reactions to the B-stimulus is analyzed. The 
most frequently used method involves presentation of stim-
uli at intensities or durations below some independently 
determined threshold of awareness (e.g., Spence & Holland, 
1962; all of Silverman's work). Early research in the 
area (reviewed by Pine, 1964) appears based on the assump-
tion that stimuli presented by any of these methods would 
bypass the mechanisms that govern the intake of supra-
liminal stimuli. Being less subject to critical judgment 
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and inhibitory control, these stimuli we·re assumed to more 
directly effect preconscious and primary process mental 
events. By looking at the influence of these stimuli on 
behavior, it was hoped that the workings of these thought 
processes would become more clear. 
Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) note that the influence 
of subliminal stimulation has been demonstrated on a wide 
variety of behaviors including: trait attributions (Klein, 
Spence, Holt, & Gourevitch, 1958; Eagle, 1959; Smith, 
Spence, & Klein, 1959), drawings (Klein, et al., 1958), 
guessing (Spence, 1961), reaction time (Spence & Bressler, 
1962), visual illusions (Smith & Henriksson, 1955) , bias 
in intentional recall (Spence & Holland, 1962; Spence, 
1964}, TAT-like stories (Pine, 1960, 1961), Rorschach con-
tent (Silverman & Silverman, 1964) , and formal aspects of 
thought (Silverman, 1967} . 1 
The influence of subliminal stimulation on dreams, 
images, and other fantasy productions has probably been 
most extensively studied. In the first study on this 
topic, Poetzl (1917/1960} exposed pictures of landscapes 
tachistoscopically for about 1/100 of a second and asked 
subjects to draw and describe what they had seen. Poetzl 
1Given the large number of studies to be discussed, 
no attempt will be made here to analyze individual studies 
on methodological or theoretical grounds. Instead, criti-
cisms applicable to many of the studies are discussed in 
the following section. Then, the work of Silverman is 
critically examined in some detail. 
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found that parts of the stimulus that were unnoticed fol-
lowing tachistoscopic exposures tended to appear later in 
dream content. Allers and Teler (1924/1960) extended 
Poetzl's findings using free-association and imagery tasks 
the day following stimulus exposure. 
Since then, a number of investigators have pursued 
these findings further. Fisher (1954) showed that un-
noticed parts of tachistoscopically presented pictures 
tended to appear in dreams and suggested that these stim-
ulus elements were influenced by unconscious wishes and 
primary process transformations. Using more rigorous 
techniques of threshold measurement, scoring criteria, and 
statistical analysis, he later demonstrated the effect of 
subliminal stimuli on both dream and image content (Fisher 
& Paul, 1959; Paul & Fisher, 1959). Shevrin and Luborsky 
(1958) reported supporting evidence and found that noticed 
aspects of the stimuli were also included in dreams. 
Eriksen (1960) criticized the foregoing studies for 
ignoring the issue of base rates for appearance of ideas 
in fantasy without prior stimulation. A related problem is 
that if a subject perceives even one element of the stim-
ulus correctly (e.g., a boat), he is bound to fantasy other 
objects (e.g., a lake, pier) normally associated with the 
perceived object. As some of these associated objects are 
likely to have been in the original picture, a spurious 
"emergence" effect may arise which has nothing to do with 
13 
below-threshold perception of the previously unreported 
elements. Eriksen also notes that subjects may have dif-
ferent criteria for reporting what they saw right after 
exposure and for reports following an imagery task. Thus, 
"recovery" effects may reflect only a lower confidence 
criterion for report. Incorporating some of the controls 
suggested by Eriksen (1960}, Hilgard (1962} investigated 
whether fantasy experience might facilitate recovery of 
initially unreported elements in a post-fantasy intentional 
recall task. Ambiguous results were obtained as judges 
rarely had great assurance that genuine recoveries were 
being scored. Johnson and Eriksen (1961) obtained no sub-
liminal recovery effect in a replication of the Shevrin and 
Lubarsky (1958) study with controls for base rate produc-
tion of stimulus related ideas. Dixon (1971) argues how-
ever that this failure to replicate may be due to the 
limited opportunities subjects had to demonstrate recovery. 
In carefully controlled studies which appear to 
have met Eriksen's (1960) criticisms, Giddan (1967) and 
Haber and Erdelyi (1967) demonstrated subjects' recovery of 
initially unavailable material. In the Haber and Erdelyi 
study, the experimental group saw a picture briefly, at-
tempted to recall it, then gave extensive free associa-
tions, followed by a second recall attempt. Two control 
groups were used. A "dart-control" group played darts in-
stead of free associating, and a "yoked-control" group was 
14 
shown the initial recall attempts of experimental subjects 
rather than the original stimuli, and were then treated in 
a way identical to that of the experimental group. Com-
parisons of initial and post-association recall drawings 
showed that the improvement in recall of the experimental 
group was superior to that of either control groups, in-
dicating that free associations resulted in the recovery of 
initially unavailable material. The results were taken to 
support the psychoanalytic hypothesis that below-conscious 
psychic material continues to influence and manifest itself 
in a variety of behaviors. They also support the thera-
peutic claim that free-association (or other fantasy pro-
duction techniques) aids in the recovery of below-conscious 
material. In the same vein, Erdelyi's more recent work 
(e.g., Erdelyi & Kleinbard, 1978) has focused on the growth 
of recall for pictures (and not words) over periods of up 
to one week after initial stimulus presentation. 
The foregoing studies on recovery of initially 
unavailable material stem originally from Freud's (1900/ 
1967) theory of the role of day residue (unnoticed stimuli) 
in dream formation. Here, barely noticed, unassimilated 
sensory impressions of the day are "selected" for dream 
content because of their resonance with unconscious wishes. 
They emerge in the dream as derivative representations of 
the wish due to the requirements of censorship and the 
nature of unconscious thinking. A somewhat different per-
15 
spective for looking at subliminal perception research 
stems loosely from Freud's (1900/1967, 1911/1958} distinc-
tion between primary process (usually unconscious, primi-
tive, non-logical, and drive-dominated) and secondary 
process (conscious, intentional, reality-oriented} think-
ing. Klein's (1959, 1967) work on the interaction of cen-
tral and peripheral trains of thought reflects this per-
spective. For Klein (1967) , an important problem was 
specifying the conditions under which peripheral ideation 
will intrude upon or become incorporated into conscious, 
intentional thinking. He hoped to shed light on the role 
of consciousness in thinking (Klein & Holt, 1960) and to 
specify the conditions determining behavioral effects of 
peripherally aroused trains of thought. Assuming that sub-
liminal stimulation would arouse peripheral trains of 
thought, the strategy here was to compare the effects of 
subliminal or incidental stimuli to those of supraliminal 
or focal stimuli. 
Examination of studies which directly compare the 
effects of subliminal and supraliminal stimulation gives 
no clear-cut answer to the question of whether and how 
these effects differ. As noted earlier, Poetzl's (1917/ 
1960) claim that unnoticed stimuli were more likely than 
noticed stimuli to appear in subsequent dreams was refuted 
by Shevrin and Lubarsky (1958). Fisher (1960) presents 
evidence suggesting that inclusion of a stimulus in a dream 
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is a complex interaction between awareness versus non-
awareness of the stimulus, subject's conflicts and de-
fenses, and meanings of the stimulus to the subject. Simi-
larly, Spence and Ehrenberg (1964} found that food depriva-
tion was the key variable related to bias in recall, 
whether the stimulus "cheese" was presented above or below 
threshold. 
Discussing the range of subliminal effects, Pine 
(1964} introduced the distinction between "direct" and 
"indirect" effects of stimuli. Direct effects are those 
that appear to have a relatively close or logical relation-
ship to the initial stimulus, though are not literal repli-
cas of it. For example, Zuckerman (1960} found that sub-
liminal presentation of the messages "writemore" or "don't 
write" resulted in significantly longer or shorter TAT 
stories. Interestingly, supraliminal presentations of the 
stimuli produced ~ consistent differences in story 
lengths. Here, it appears that supraliminal stimuli can be 
used as appropriate or discarded as irrelevant depending on 
the subject's intentions. Smith, Spence and Klein (1959) 
presented either the word "happy" or "angry" masked by a 
supraliminal picture of a face that was affectively 
neutral. The stimulus words biased responses towards more 
positive or more negative descriptions of the face, though 
the words themselves were rarely used in descriptions. 
Instead, common associates and words logically related to 
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the stimulus words were often used, while remote symbolic 
associates were not. 
Indirect effects are those \vhich are not obviously 
related to the initial stimulus. They include symbolic 
transformations of the original stimulus and often suggest 
primary process thinking (i.e., use of condensation, sym-
bolization, displacement). Pine (1960) illustrated in-
direct effects in a study where subjects read a focal pas-
sage while overhearing another passage read in an adjacent 
room (incidental stimulus) • Though the focal passage (em-
phasizing the phallic-aggressive aspects of a hook) in-
fluenced subsequent TAT stories in an undistorted manner, 
the incidental passage (emphasizing the oral-passive as-
pects of a cow) emerged in an indirect, distorted manner. 
Indirect effects included an increase in themes of passive 
and nurturant human relationships, but not an increase in 
cow-like content. Reviewing this issue, Wolitzky and 
Wachtel (1973) conclude that while indirect effects are 
less likely with supraliminal stimuli, subliminal stimuli 
can give rise to both direct and indirect effects given 
appropriate response measures. The issue of the differen-
tial effects of subliminal versus supraliminal stimuli 
appears to be a complex one probably involving other vari-
ables such as subjects' current drive state and intentional 
set. 
Numerous other studies have investigated subject 
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variables and stimulus conditions which facilitate or in-
hibit subliminal effects. These have been recently re-
viewed by Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) and by Dixon (1971) 
who concludes that subliminal effects are facilitated when 
subjects are in a low state of arousal, attention is un-
selective or broadened, and cognitions are intuitive, 
global, symbolic, and unbound by logical restraints. These 
conclusions have recently been complicated by Sackein, 
Packer, and Gur's (1977) report of an interaction between 
hemisphericity and induced cognitive set ("intuitive" or 
"analytic") on subliminal effects. 
Of the models advanced by various psychoanalytic 
writers to explain these results, the most representative 
is the "schema activation" model proposed by Klein and Holt 
(1960). They define a schema as an organized group of 
memory traces, including both conceptual associates and 
drive-related derivatives. They assume that every percep-
tual process includes scanning of memory schemata so that 
incoming stimuli can be recognized and take on meaning. 
Further, any schema may be activated by: (a) sets or 
anticipations, (b) the scanning process that selects traces 
which match incoming stimuli, and (c) connections to drives. 
The results of Poetzl (1917/1960) and followers are inter-
preted by Klein and Holt to indicate that stimuli can acti-
vate relevant schema and lead to behavioral effects even if 
they are not consciously noticed. Stimuli that make con-
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tact with an active drive schema seem to have an advantage 
for recovery. They note that in masking studies, the first 
or A-stimulus will activate certain schemas. If these are 
relevant to some ambiguous property of the second or B-
stimulus, reactions to the second stimulus will be biased. 
If the stimulus is a brief flash, the authors write that it 
may emerge into imagery if the subject can suspend realis-
tic, problem-oriented thinking. Thus, schema activated by 
the stimulus become more available relative to other 
schema. 
The foregoing model is part of a larger theoretical 
framework (Klein, 1967) which assumes that in addition to 
conscious concerns and focal intentions, there are concur-
rent trains of thought in a state of activation that also 
make claims on response channels. Insofar as subliminal or 
incidental stimulation can be considered to activate these 
peripheral trains of thought, the method offers a way to 
study their emergence in various response channels. 
Subliminal Perception Research and 
Word Association 
Dixon (1971) reports unpublished data showing 
elicitation of associative responses by subliminally pre-
sented stimuli. Subjects were subliminally exposed to the 
numerals "1," "2," or "6" and asked to guess their iden-
tity. Only the responses "one," "two," or "six" were 
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allowed. When "6" was presented, subjects tended to re-
spond with "six." The stimulua "1" however, tended to 
evoke "two" as a response. Similarly, Worthington and 
Dixon (1964) found a tendency for subjects to respond with 
the next highest number following subliminal presentations 
of numbers between one and nine. Dixon (1971) interprets 
these results as support for the tendency of subliminal 
input to trigger responses associated to rather than iden-
tical with the original stimuli. He argues that studies 
of associative responses provide the most important evi-
dence that subjects respond to the meaning rather than to 
the structure of subliminal stimuli. 
Two groups of studies are directly relevant to this 
issue of the associative nature of responses to subliminal 
stimuli. In addition to the data mentioned above, two 
other studies by Dixon are pertinent. Dixon (1956) asked 
subjects to write down the first word that carne to mind in 
response to a supraliminal cue which followed subliminal 
presentations of words. Contrary to initial expectation, 
the responses given by subjects were not identical to the 
stimuli. A positive relationship between emotionality of 
stimuli and latency of response was found however, indi-
cating that subjects had responded to the meaning of the 
stimuli. A post hoc analysis revealed what Dixon calls the 
"Freudian" nature of subjects' associative responses (e.g., 
the stimulus "penis .. followed by the response "cheroot"). 
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In a related study, Dixon (1958) asked subjects to say the 
first word that came to mind at a visual signal. Again, he 
found responses frequently had a "Freudian" relationship to 
stimulus words. Subjects' GSRs were higher during presen-
tations of emotional compared to neutral words though 
latency of response was not differentially affected. A 
week after the experiment proper, subjects were able to 
match the associations they had given earlier to the origi-
nal words (now presented supraliminally) at a better than 
chance rate. 
In a replication attempt of .the later studies, 
Fuhrer and Eriksen (1960) found that subjects could later 
match their associations to stimuli only when they had 
first been presented at brightness levels which allowed de-
tection of the presence of the stimulus. A control group 
presented the stimuli upside-down and backward performed as 
well on the matching task as the experimental group. These 
authors conclude that matching on the basis of available 
structural cues (e.g., word length) could have accounted 
for Dixon's results. Banreti-Fuchs (1967) found that 
latency of associative response was unrelated to emotion-
ality of subliminally presented stimulus words. In a 
second experiment, subjects were asked to guess the num-
bers on a card held by the experimenter while they watched 
a brightly illuminated screen upon which a "5" was periodi-
cally flashed. Only when the "5" was presented at avail-
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able or partially available levels did subjects guess this 
nuwber more often than when no figure was flashed. 
In response to tnesefailed replication attempts, 
Dixon (1968, 1971) argues persuasively that they differed 
in important ways from the original studies. He notes that 
both replications presented the subliminal stimuli at the 
same time as the signal to respond, while stimuli preceded 
response signal in the originals. He argues that this 
could have diverted subjects' attention from the stimulus 
at the critical moment. Regarding Banreti-Fuchs' (1967) 
second experiment, he notes that the black circle in which 
the number was flashed could have acted against subliminal 
registration at the retinal level. Also, subjects fully 
aware of the "5" being presented gave that number on only 
136 of 540 trials. Dixon's explanation is that subjects 
had a set to guess numbers on a card held by the experi-
menter rather than to say the number being flashed. That 
no subliminal effect was observed is consistent with 
Allison's (1963) findings and Klein and Holt's (1960) prop-
osition that for a subliminal stimulus to be effective, 
there must be no competing cognitive structures. Noting 
the fragility of subliminal effects, Dixon (1971) concludes 
that these replication attempts "show how easy it is to 
prevent a weak stimulus from having an effect on behavior 
(p. 78)." 
The second group of relevant studies involves word 
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association as a dependent measure following subliminal 
stimulation with groups of schizophrenics. Silverman and 
Spiro (1976b) presented pictures of humans (man reading a 
newspaper vs. menacing looking man with dagger in hand) or 
of animals (lion charging with teeth bared vs. bird with 
wings spread) designed to compare effects of aggressive and 
neutral stimuli. Responses to word association tests were 
collected subsequent to subliminal stimulation and were 
compared for number of deviant responses. These included 
loose, personal, and clang associations, repetitions of 
stimulus word, failure to respond, blocking, and multi-word 
responses. Each deviant response was scored from one to 
three reflecting the degree of deviation. An inter-judge 
reliability coefficient of .95 was reported. For their 40 
schizophrenic subjects, associations following either ag-
gressive stimulus presentation were judged significantly 
more deviant than those following neutral stimuli. Mea-
sures involving story recall and "projection of aggression" 
were not affected in this study. Silverman and Spiro 
(1968) essentially replicated this finding with 32 schizo-
phrenic subjects and pictures of animals. Here, supra-
liminal presentation of the same stimuli produced no dif-
ferential effect on word associations. 
Finally, Silverman, Spiro, ~veisberg, and Candell 
(1969) presented a variety of drive-related stimuli to 52 
schizophrenic subjects. Stimuli included words and pic-
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tures of humans described as neutral ("Men Talking"), 
libidinal ( "Fuck A Woman") , merging ("Mommy And I Are One"), 
and aggressive ("Destroy Mother"). A set of milder "im-
plicit" stimuli consisting of pictures of animals related 
to each theme was also presented. With the explicit ag-
gressive stimuli, the authors found the predicted effect on 
word associations but not for a story recall task. The irn-
plicit aggressive stimuli affected story recall but not 
word association. This failure to replicate earlier re-
sults with the implicit aggressive stimuli was attributed 
to a subject group difference involving length of hospital-
ization. Additionally, neither libidinal or merging stirn-
uli had an effect on word association or story recall. The 
present author is aware of no published independent repli-
cation attempts of Silverman's work with word association. 
Consideration of his overall research program follows a 
review of the major criticisms of the subliminal perception 
paradigm. 
Critiques of the Subliminal 
Perception Paradigm 
Many of the studies reviewed above could have been 
criticized on various grounds, the most common being small 
sample size, weak or ambiguous results, and lack of inde-
pendent replication. In addition, many studies fail to 
report relevant details such as illumination levels, 
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stimulus size and contrast, method for determining thresh-
old, and length of dark adaption. Because of these prob-
lems and an unknown number of negative results, the re-
sults of these studies must be regarded as tentative and 
interpreted with caution. The sequence of subliminal 
studies suggests that often when researchers are dissatis-
fied with weak results, they think of some possible medi-
ating variable and then control for it in a subsequent 
study. Even if positive results are then obtained, sys-
tematic investigations of the new variable and replications 
are rarely reported. This apparent pattern has resulted in 
a plethora of variables possibly relevant to subliminal 
effects with little systematic knowledge about any one. 
Further, little attention is paid to establishing the re-
liability of earlier studies. Although there has recently 
been increased acceptance of the phenomenon due to use of 
signal detection techniques and persuasive theoretical ac-
counts (e.g., Dixon, 1971; Erdelyi, 1974; Walker, 1978), 
some writers continue to question the validity of the con-
cept (e.g., Neisser, 1967; Wiener & Kleespies, 1968). 
Before discussing the research program of Silverman 
and associates, it will be helpful to review the major 
methodological and theoretical criticisms that have been 
directed towards subliminal perception research. The pur-
pose here is not to evaluate the overall validity of the 
paradigm (see Dixon, 1971) but to lay the groundwork for 
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judging the merits of a particular research program. 
In his review of the literature on discrimination 
and learning without awareness, Eriksen (1960) notes that 
terms like "conscious," "unconscious," and "awareness" are 
often defined differently across studies. Especially im-
portant to studies using an absolute threshold paradigm is 
the operational definition of threshold of awareness. 
Eriksen notes that this is usually defined in terms of sub-
jects' verbal report, thus placing a burden on the adequacy 
of the language to reflect the richness of perceptual ex-
perience. Thus, the threshold of a given subject depends 
on several variables, including: adequacy of the experi-
menter's questions, use or lack of use of a ready signal, 
whether or not a forced-choice format is employed, and the 
adequacy of the scale used to classify subjects' answers. 
He suggests drawings or use of forced-choice methods may 
reveal that subjects are aware of more than they can ver-
bally report. 
Bevan (1964) and Eriksen (1960) note that threshold 
is a statistical estimate of something that varies over 
time and is commonly described as the point at which a sub-
ject correctly discriminates (either a stimulus from a 
blank field or one stimulus from another) at a 50 percent 
rate. Because of this, subjects may sometimes be aware of 
the stimulus even when presented below this level. This 
could create the false impression of a subliminal effect. 
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Clearly, the subliminal stimulus should be presented at a 
level below the range of values from which the threshold 
was derived. In response to these cogent criticisms and 
suggestions for determining threshold, many recent studies 
(e.g., Zwosta & Z~nhausern, 1969), have employed more 
rigorous threshold procedures using signal detection tech-
niques to separate sensitivity from criterion factors. 
Studies using a masking paradigm have also been 
criticized by Eriksen (1960) for rarely including careful 
threshold determinations (e.g., Smith, Spence, & Klein, 
1958). He notes that in the study cited, some control sub-
jects alerted to the fact that words would be flashed prior 
to the picture were able to detect the A-stimulus. Neisser 
(1967) criticizes the backward masking paradign on evolu-
tionary grounds. Given the specialized nature and un-
usualness of backward masking, he doubts that evolution 
would have equipped the mind with unconscious mechanisms 
for dealing with it. Dixon (1971) counters this argument 
claiming that natural selection probably favored organisms 
losing the least information from the environment. 
Neisser (1967} also criticizes the Smith et al. 
(1958} study for the possibility that "demand characteris-
tics" were operating. In particular, he points out that 
the experimenter may have known the order of the A-stimulus 
exposures and so influenced subjects' reports of the B-
stimulus accordingly. In the same vein, he criticizes 
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studies using free association measures where the experi-
menter knows which are the critical cue words. Significant 
here is the attempted replication of Spence (1964) by 
Bruel, Ginsberg, Lukomnik, and Schrneidler (1966). Using 
the same free association task as the original experiment, 
they obtained non-significant results when using an ex-
perimenter naive to the hypothesis. However, an informed 
experimenter instructed to emphasize the critical cue words 
also obtained non-significant results. As Dixon (1971) 
notes, the mechanisms underlying the alleged operation of 
"demand characteristics" in these studies are unknown and 
may involve communication processes on the same order of 
myste~iousness as subliminal perception. In any event, 
experimental controls guarding:cqqainst this possibility are 
necessary for straightforward interpretation of results. 
Perhaps the most cogent criticism (at least the 
most publically debated) of the subliminal perception para-
digm is that the availability of partial stimulus cues may 
account for the observed effects. Advanced by Goldiamond 
(1958) and Eriksen (1960) as a possible explanation of per-
ceptual defense studies, the position is stated most 
clearly by Kempler and Wiener (1963). The later authors 
draw a distinction between one-process and two-process 
views of perception. Briefly, the two-process view (their 
example, Klein et al., 1958) assumes the existence of two 
relatively independent perceptual processes; a supraliminal 
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one operating within awareness and a subliminal one opera-
ting outside awareness. Further, the subliminal process 
can make affective or evaluative reactions to the stimulus 
before the subject can discriminate and report it. Thus, 
the meaning of a stimulus is apprehended prior to correct 
recognition. The one-process view posits a single percep-
tual process described by a monotonic relationship between 
stimulus intensity or duration and response strength. 
Thus, lowered stimulus intensity will lead to impoverished 
responses, but is not expected to produce qualitatively 
different responses. Kempler and Wiener argue that, in 
studies obtaining subliminal effects, refined threshold 
procedures would reveal the availability of partial cues to 
which subjects respond in a predictable manner. Differ-
ences in response to weak inputs are seen by the authors as 
"a function of differential response characteristics of a 
subject (or between subjects) to the specific seen part 
cues" (1963, p. 352, their emphasis)~ 
Guthrie and Wiener (1966) offered empirical evi-
dence for the "part-cue response-characteristic" model as a 
tenable explanation of results obtained by Eagle (1959). 
Eagle used the masking paradigm in which either an aggres-
sive or benevolent picture was immediately followed by 
supraliminal exposure of a neutral picture. Subjects' 
ratings of the neutral Ficture varied systematically with 
the different masked stimuli. Noting that the two masked 
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stimuli appeared to vary in structural attributes as well 
as in content, Guthrie and Wiener asked subjects to rate 
supraliminal presentations of line drawings varying in 
angularity and line thickness. As predicted, angular lines 
were rated negatively while curved lines were rated posi-
tively. To show that this structural cue may have been 
available to Eagle's subjects, they demonstrated that sub-
jects rated the original aggressive stimulus as more angu-
lar than the benevolent stimulus when presented in an 
ascending series (starting below threshold). Finally, they 
constructed stimuli which varied in angularity and thematic 
content (presence or absence of a gun) and presented these 
as stimuli masked by an ambiguous supraliminal stimulus. 
As predicted, subjects' ratings of the ambiguous stimulus 
varied significantly with the angularity of the masked 
stimulus and not wi~~ the presence or absence of the gun. 
In addition, the closer to recognition threshold the angu-
lar masked stimulus was presented, the more negative 
ratings were given. The authors conclude that predictable 
differences in response to available structural cues can 
account for the behavior ascribed to subliminal perception. 
Responding to this study, Silverman and Spiro 
(1967a) collected subjects' ratings of angularity of ag-
gressive and neutral stimuli used in earlier studies which 
obtained predicted subliminal effects (e.g., Silverman, 
1965) . For both exposures in ascending series and at 
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durations used in the experiments proper, the aggressive 
stimuli were never judged to be significantly more angular 
than the neutral stimuli. In three comparisons, neutral 
stimuli were judged more angular, contrary to Guthrie and 
Wiener's (1966) findings. Silverman and Spiro also note 
several studies (e.g., Spence & Holland, 1962; Fiss, Gold-
berger, & Klein, 1963; Silverman & Silverman, 1964) that 
employed a "discrimination task" in response to the par-
tial-cue criticisms of Eriksen (1960) and others. In this 
task, experimental and control stimuli are presented ran-
domly under the same tachistoscopic conditions as they were 
in the experiment proper and the subject's task is to tell 
them apart (without having to identify them). If stimuli 
are yielding different partial cues, a better than chance 
discrimination presumably should be made. Though signifi-
cant subliminal effects were obtained in t~ese studies, 
almost no subjects were able to make this discrimination. 
Silverman and Spiro report that the subjects who could make 
the discrimination tended to show less subliminal effect 
than the majority who could not. Additionally, they cite a 
study by Spence and Holland (1962) which suggested ~~at the 
availability of partial-cues significantly interfered with 
subliminal effects. 
In a somewhat philosophical rejoinder, Hiener and 
Kleespies (1968) argue that one can never "prove" that some 
supraliminal cues are not available. Their position states 
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that some cues are available, not necessarily angularity, 
which could account for observed effects. Finally, Silver-
man (1968) replies by claiming that part-cue adherents need 
to demonstrate structural differences between pairs of 
neutral and critical stimuli and also that these differ-
ences are likely to emerge during the experiment proper 
(e.g., by a "discrimination task"). Clearly, part-cue 
theory has difficulty explaining how subjects can react 
differently to supraliminal cues of two stimuli when they 
are unable to tell whether the stimuli are the same or dif-
ferent. 
The final criticism of the subliminal perception 
paradigm to be considered is that it implies some sort of 
"pre-perceiver" or "little-man-inside-the-head" that per-
ceives and reacts to stimuli before ~~ey are consciously 
experienced. This debate appears to stem from different 
orientations toward psychology and semantic biases. For 
example, Eriksen's (1960) implication of a "superdiscrimi-
nating unconscious" seems to imply more of a homunculus 
than does Dixon's (1971), p. 90) "antecedent physiological 
processes which do not have phenomenal representation." 
Erdelyi (1974) suggests that this problem is ameliorated if 
t~e phenomenon is understood in information-processing 
terms. He argues: 
that a system with control processes for internal 
regulation, including regulation of input, violates 
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no sacrosanct edict of science, nor does it imply the 
literal existence of little men or demons in the head 
(1974, p. 4). 
Acceptance of these sorts of internal control pro-
cesses does not necessarily imply acceptance of subliminal 
perception. Neisser (1967) argues that the pre-attentive 
processes implicated by this view are cruder and less ac-
curate than focal ones and so could not be expected to 
operate at an input level below that for attentive (i.e., 
conscious) processes. For the same reason, they could not 
be expected to recognize and react to the meaning of stim-
uli prior to conscious recognition. The results of some 
subliminal studies (particularly those of Silverman) cer-
tainly do implicate some very complex and acqurate pro-
cesses occurring at below conscious levels. To account for 
these results, Dixon (1971) offers an information-proces-
sing model involving multiple inputs giving rise to pre-
conscious parallel processing. Following a microgenetic 
view of perception (Werner, 1948), he posits a stage in 
perceptual processing where meaning is extracted while 
naming is impossible. As additional evidence of this 
stage, he offers observations of aphasics who clearly 
recognize but cannot name objects. He suggests that im-
poverished stimulation, as well as cortical damage, may 
operate to stop perceptual processing at this preconscious 
level. 
In conclusion, the debate over subliminal percep-
34 
tion has ranged across many psychological viewpoints for 
more than two decades. Perhaps the primary reason for the 
abundance of debate is the frequency of poorly controlled 
studies which show weak or ambiguous subliminal effects. 
This is complicated by the apparently small range of stirn-
ulus values between which the phenomenon is demonstrable 
(Hilgard, 1962). Secondly, the idea of subliminal percep-
tion has often appeared to contradict common sense notions 
of perception (e.g., "If I cannot see it, I cannot react to 
it.") and many epistemological assumptions about perception 
and behavior (e.g., Wiener & Kleespies' [1968] "realism in 
perception" position). Nonetheless, the paradigm has 
gained increasing acceptance as theoretical viewpoints have 
changed (Dixon, 1971) and the part-processes hypothetically 
underlying the phenomenon are better understood (e.g., 
Moray, 1970). How several of the criticisms mentioned 
above apply to the research program of Silverman and asso-
ciates are examined in the following section. 
Silverman's Research on "Subliminal 
Psychodynamic Activation" 
tvi thin the context of attempts to clarify and vali-
date some aspects fo psychoanalytic theory, Silve.rman and 
his collaborators at New York University have published 
over 25 studies (summarized in Silverman, 1976) using a 
laboratory technique termed "subliminal psychodynamic 
activation." The theory behind this technique derives from 
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Freud's model of unconscious conflict and defense as they 
relate to psychopathological symptomatology. Following 
Klein and Holt's (1960) emphasis on the importance of the 
drive-relevance of subliminal stimuli, Silverman (1976) 
assumes that a stimulus containing wish-related content 
makes contact with derivatives of the related wish if the 
wish is currently active in the person. Thus, the sublimi-
nal input produces an effect analogous to that of an in-
ternally generated increase in intensity of an unconscious 
wish. In line with Pine's (1964} notion of indirect sub-
liminal effects and the theory of psychodynamic defenses, 
Silverman argues that the ideas and images activated by 
this input are likely to be transformed so that their wish-
related character is obscured. They are thus not expected 
to come directly into awareness but rather to press for 
expression without the person's awareness. For Silverman, 
this is evidenced by increases or decreases in the psycho-
pathological symptoms related to the unconscious wish, the 
direction depending on whether the stimulus has conflict-
intensifying or conflict-alleviating connotations. Appendix 
D addresses ethical concerns relevant to this research.) 
The idea of activation of an unconscious wish or 
conflict suggests that the present paradigm is closely re-
lated to the more comprehensive "schema activation" model 
proposed by Klein and Holt (1960). As noted earlier, 
Klein's (1970) programmatic research interest was to ex-
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plore the interactions between peripheral and focal trains 
of thought. His work was directed towards understanding 
the cognitive and perceptual processes involved and speci-
fying the conditions under which an incidental input ef-
fects behavior and conscious experience. In contrast, 
Silverman (1977) appears to accept implicitly a model of 
how subliminal input can affect behavior and goes on to use 
the technique to test specific hypotheses about psycho-
pathology. His goal has been to validate and clarify psy-
choanalytic propositions relating particular symptoms 
(e.g., depression) to particular unconscious conflicts 
(e.g., aggression turned towards the self). Before looking 
at the results of this research, the experimental method is 
reviewed. 
Essentially, the effect on psychopathological be-
havior of subliminal presentation of wish-related stimuli 
is compared to that of subliminal presentation of (rela-
tively) neutral stimuli. Sessions typically begin with a 
"baseline" assessment of subjects' propensity for whatever 
behavior is being studied. This is followed by 4-msec 
tachistoscopic exposures to conflict-related or neutral 
stimuli. Both pictorial and verbal stimuli are shown four 
times for each condition and both experimenter and subject 
are blind to stimulus content. A re-assessment of patho-
logical behavior follows the tachistoscopic presentations. 
This procedure is repeated for other neutral and critical 
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stimuli in the same session or the next day. Silverman 
(1976) reports predicted results on a variety of behaviors, 
including thought process, feeling state, speech disorder, 
non-verbal behavior, and sexual attraction. 
The bulk of the earlier studies in this program 
were directed towards investigating the role of aggressive 
wishes and merging fantasies in schizophrenic symptomatol-
ogy (summarized in Silverman, 1975) . A variety of aggres-
sive and neutral stimuli were used, e.g., a lion charging 
versus a bird flying, man holding a dagger versus a man 
reading a newspaper, and the verbal stimuli CANNIBAL EATS 
PERSON versus PEOPLE ARE WALKING. Generally, the aggres-
sive stimuli led to increased pathological behavior mea-
sured by Rorschach content, TAT stories, word associations, 
and a six-point scale measuring "non-verbal pathological 
behavior" (e.g., inappropriate laughter). Later studies 
suggested that the effect \vas a delayed one (Silverman, 
1971) and that it was more reliably obtained with long-term 
rather than short-term schizophrenic patients (Silverman & 
Candell, 1970). 
Other studies (e.g. , Si 1 verman, Spiro, 'Neisberg, & 
Candell, 1969) report that subliminal presentation of the 
message MOMMY AND I ARE ONE (a "symbiotic-gratification 
fantasy") led to a decrease in pathological behavior among 
differentiated but not undifferentiated schizophrenics. 
Silverman (1977) reports unpublished findings (Kaplan, 
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1976; Kaye, 1975) suggesting these ameliorative effects are 
specific to this message as several closely related mes-
sages (e.g., MOMMY IS ALWAYS WITH ME) had no effect on 
pathological behavior. These results are interpreted to 
support the hypotheses that symbiotic fantasy gratification 
reduces pathology in schizophrenics while activation of 
aggressive fantasy intensifies pathological manifestations. 
Further studies have investigated psychoanalytic 
hypotheses relating specific stimulus content to depres-
sion, homosexuality, stuttering, and competition. Rutstein 
and Goldberger (1973) found that presentation of aggressive 
stimuli led to significantly higher self-ratings of depres-
sion but to no change in Rorschach measures of "aggression 
directed inward" among non-psychotic depressed patients. 
Supporting the psychoanalytic hypothesis that homosexuality 
involves (in part) a flight from incest, Silverman, Kwawer, 
Wolitzky, and Caron (1973) found that stimuli containing 
incestuous themes produced an increase in homosexual and a 
decrease in heterosexual feelings reported by a group of 
homosexual males. In another study (Silverman, Klinger, 
Lustbader, Farrel, & Martin, 1972), stuttering was found to 
increase after subliminal presentations of anal content as 
compared to neutral content. Finally, Silverman, Ross, 
Adler, and Lustig (1978) found competitive behavior (dart 
throwing) was effected by oedipally-related stimuli that 
either sanctioned or condemned the idea of defeating father. 
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For Silverman (1976, 1977), these results support particu-
lar psychoanalytic notions relating forms of pathology to 
specific unconscious wishes and conflicts. 
Noting that many of these results could be ex-
plained by the generally negative affective quality of the 
various stimuli rather than their specific meaningful con-
tent, Silverman, Bronstein, and Mendelsohn (1976) tested 
new groups of stutterers, homosexuals, depressives, and 
schizophrenics. Each subject was subliminally exposed to 
three sets of stimuli: (a) the "relevant" wish-related 
stimulus (aggressive for the schizophrenics and depressives, 
incest for ·the homosexuals, and anal for the stutterers); 
(b) an "irrelevant" wish-related stimulus, but one that in-
tensified the symptoms of one of the other groups (incest 
for schizophrenics and stutterers, aggressive for the homo-
sexuals, and anal for the depressives); and (c) a neutral-
control stimulus. Three of the four groups showed signifi-
cant increases in pathology after exposure to their "rele-
vant" wish-related stimulus (depressives showed mixed re-
sults). In no instance did the "irrelevant" stimulus in-
fluence the symptom under consideration. These results 
were interpreted as support for the psychoanalytic posi-
tion that symptoms have specific meanings and express an 
individual's struggle with a particular conflictual wish. 
In other recent studies, subliminal presentations 
of the HOr-1l1Y AND I ARE ONE stimulus have been shown to 
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enhance the effect of various therapeutic modalities with 
overweight women (Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & Mendelsohn, 
1978) and with insect phobics (Silverman, Frank, & 
Dachinger, 1974). Silverman (Note 2) reports unpublished 
findings (Parker, in preparation) that repeated exposures 
to this stimulus as compared to a neutral one resulted in 
higher exam scores for a group of college students. In 
perhaps his most provocative work to date, Silverman 
(1978a, Note 2) uses these results and those obtained with 
oedipally-related stimuli to advance a thesis regarding the 
role of unconscious fantasy in psychotherapeutic success. 
In particular, he posits that certain therapies (e.g., 
systematic desensitization, client-centered therapy, anq 
meditation) are apt to activate symbiotic-gratification 
fantasies in which the therapist is unconsciously perceived 
as the good symbiotic mother. Other therapies (e.g., 
Masters and Johnson type sex therapy, body contact thera-
pies, assertiveness training, and encounter treatment) are 
more likely to activate fantasies of sanctioned oedipal 
gratification in which the therapist is unconsciously ex-
perienced as a permissive superego figure. In light of his 
research findings on the effects of subliminal activation 
of these two fantasies, Silverman argues that their inad-
vertant activation may play a significant role in the 
therapeutic success of many forms of therapy. 
In sum, Silverman and his associates have put to-
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gether one of the most ambitious and voluminous research 
programs on subliminal perception to date. More than 25 
studies have been published while an additional 30 studies 
remain unpublished (Silverman, Note 3). As noted above, 
these findings may have far-reaching implications for 
understanding therapeutic processes (Silverman, Note 2) and 
for developing new therapeutic methods (e.g., Silverman, 
Martin, Ungaro, & Mendelsohn, 1978) . Purporting to vali-
date psychoanalytic hypotheses about symptom formation and 
unconscious motivation, the program may approach the 
"promise of a clinical-experimental psychology of uncon-
scious phenomena" (Wolitzky & Wachtel, 1973, p. 840) hoped 
for by earlier investigators. Certainly, the experimental 
results are not readily explained by many modern perceptual 
and visual information-processing theories (e.g., Neisser, 
1967) • Given these implications and the claims made by the 
researchers, the need for careful evaluation and indepen-
dent replication is clearly indicated. Some general criti-
cisms reflecting on the validity and reliability of the 
overall research program are discussed next. This is fol-
lowed by a description of a particular study and the re-
sults of a replication attempt. 
Perusal of individual studies suggests that experi-
mental results are rarely straightfon1ard and unambiguous. 
This appears especially true for the hypotheses that have 
been most extensively investigated. For example, later 
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studies using aggressive stimuli with schizophrenics ob-
tained inconsistent results that were explained in terms of 
a "delayed effect" (Silverman, 1971) and differences be-
tween long-term and short-term patients (Silverman & 
Candell, 1970). Greenberg (1977) also notes the lack of 
consistency in effect across studies and complains that 
Silverman shifted rather hastily from one measurement tech-
nique to another without exploring in detail or depth the 
limits of the various measures of effect. In a similar 
vein, Shapiro (1978) notes that studies of symbiotic stim-
uli with schizophrenics have also obtained inconsistent 
results in that significance tends to occur on one or 
another measure but rarely on all measures used in a study. 
Moreover, the effects appear on different measures from 
study to study. Shapiro argues that this raises some 
questions as to the nature of the effects and what under-
lies them. Silverman (1978b) replies to this criticism 
claiming that the common effect in these studies was 
greater adaptive functioning after stimulation and that the 
fact that it is found on different measures at different 
times raises questions for further research, but does not 
challenge the basic thesis. Silverman appears correct in 
asserting that these inconsistent results raise further 
research questions. His labeling the common effect as 
"greater adaptive functioning" ignores, however, the direct 
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challenge to replicability and reliability posed by these 
inconsistent results. 
The reader also notes Silverman's tendency to in-
voke personality variables when accounting for inconsistent 
or weak results (e.g., the "deniers" in Silverman, Bron-
stein, & Mendelsohn's [1976] sample of depressives). 
Though these variables may well prove to be important and 
so should be investigated, attention need also be paid to 
specifying the range of stimulus conditions within which 
subliminal effects are obtained. 2 Given other reviewers' 
(e.g., Dixon, 1977) emphasis on the small range of stimulus 
values for which subliminal effects occur, Silverman's lack 
of careful consideration here is somewhat surprising. For 
example, except for very recent reports (e.g., Silverman, 
Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978), this reviewer found ~ 
studies for which illumination levels were reported for 
both the blank and stimulus fields. Room illumination 
levels and time given for subjects to adapt to tachisto-
scope lighting before subliminal exposures are also notably 
lacking. Finally, details on the construction, brightness, 
and contrast of stimulus cards are usually absent. Beside 
prohibiting conclusions about the stimulus range of sub-
2Given the present state of knowledge regarding 
subliminal phenomena, it may be argued that it is most ap-
propriate to first establish the stimulus parameters for 
which subliminal perception is reliably demonstrable, and 
then to investigate the contributions of personality and 
other mediating variables. 
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liminal effects, these oversights make exact replication 
impossible. In one attempted replication, Emmelkamp and 
Straatman (i976) found that two of their twenty subjects 
could exactly reproduce the experimental stimuli following 
4-msec exposures. 
Except for one footnote (Silverman & Spiro, 1976a, 
p. 329) referring to an earlier study (Silverman, 1966) in 
which no significant differences were found between 4-msec 
and 6-msec stimulus exposures, this reviewer found neither 
empirical evidence nor rationale regarding the choice of 
4-msec exposure speeds, durations between exposures (usu-
ally 3 seconds) or number of exposures (usually 4) . Again, 
attention to and systematic variation of these variables 
could significantly contribute to understanding what stim-
ulus values underlie subliminal effects. Similarly, care-
ful threshold determination procedures are rarely reported 
in the studies. Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) 
do report threshold data obtained with one of the two tach-
istoscopes used in their study, but fail to specify the 
procedures used to collect the data. As Eriksen (1960) and 
others have noted, differing methods may obtain quite dif-
ferent threshold estimates. Thus, Silverman's data give 
little indication of how far below awareness the reported 
phenomena are demonstrable. 
Many of the criticisms and the results of EITmelkamp 
and Straatman (1976) mentioned above raise a question re-
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garding the possibility that partial cues were available to 
subjects in some studies. Silverman and Spiro (1967a) and 
Silverman (1968) offer data and persuasive arguments 
against this possibility for (at least) many of their 
studies. Particularly impressive is their report that sub-
jects were unable to discriminate between (without having 
to identify) neutral and critical stimuli when presented 
under the conditions used in several experiments. Un-
fortunately, the discrimination task has not been adminis-
tered to subjects in all studies (e.g., Silverman, Frank, 
& Dachinger, 1974). Silverman (1976) marshalls further 
support against the partial-cue hypothesis from several 
studies in which stimuli were presented at both 4-msec and 
10 second durations (e.g., Rutstein & Goldberger, 1973). 
In none of the seven studies mentioned did supraliminal ex-
posures lead to significant changes in measured pathology 
while all obtained predicted subliminal effects. Though 
supportive of the subliminal hypothesis, findings that sub-
jects react differently to completely available stimuli (or 
to different amounts of part-cue availability) cannot dis-
prove the partial cue hypothesis (1/liener & Klees pies, 
1968). As an overstated example, one can easily imagine 
that subjects' reactions to the part-cue "HI" might differ 
considerably from those to the complete word "SHIT." 
As some of the foregoing criticisms are applicable 
to most or all of the studies considered, the strength and 
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reliability of the overall findings is called into ques-
tion. These methodological flaws also create doubt as to 
whether the experiments are valid tests of the psycho-
analytic hypotheses they are purported to test. In this 
regard, investigations testing the specificity of relation-
ships between symptoms and stimulus content (Silverman, 
Bronstein, & Mendelsohn, 1976) and those comparing the 
effects of semantically related stimulus contents (reported 
in Silverman, 1977) are most provocative in their support 
for psychoanalytic hypotheses relative to other hypotheses. 
Given these questions about the reliability of the 
overall findings and the validity of the "subliminal psy-
chodynamic activation" construct hypothesized to underlie 
the results, the need for independent replication of any 
part of this research program is clearly apparent. Silver-
man (Note 3} lists nineteen studies completed \V'i thout his 
sponsorship. Only three of these have been published. 
Rutstein and Goldberger's (1973) study of depressives was 
completed while Rutstein was a graduate student at New York 
Univer~ity and obtained inconsistent results. The other 
articles (Greenberg, 1976; Emmelkamp & Straatman, 1976) 
appear in journals published outside the United States and 
essentially fail to replicate Silverman's findings. Green-
berg (1976) compared the effects of aggressive ana neutral 
stimuli with schizophrenics. His only significant finding 
was an increase in a Rorschach measure of pathological 
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thinking following exposure of the neutral stimulus, op-
posite Silverman's findings. Emmelkamp and Straatman 
(1976) found no subliminal effect \'lith a symbiotic gratifi-
cation stimulus on snake phobics in an attempted replica-
tion of Silverman, Frank, and Dachinger (1974). Un-
fortunately, all of these replication attempts suffer from 
many of the same methodological shortcomings discussed with 
regard to the original studies. 
Subliminal Perception Studies with 
Oedipally-Related Stimuli 
In an effort to encourage replication and to demon-
strate subliminal effects on a type of behavior not pre-
viously studied, Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) 
report results of four experiments using a relatively sim-
ple behavioral measure and college males as subjects. The 
major intention of each experiment was to manipulate, 
through subliminal presentation of conflict-related rna-
terial, the degree of oedipal conflict in the subjects and 
to observe the effects of this on subjects' accuracy in 
dart-throwing competition. Stimuli were chosen either to 
intensify oedipal conflict by condemning the idea of de-
feating father in competition or to alleviate the conflict 
by sanctioning this idea. The verbal message BEATING DAD 
IS OK was presented for the sanctioning condition, and 
BEATING DAD IS HRONG was used for the condemning situation. 
Each message was presented following congruous pictures of 
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an older and younger man both smiling (sanctioning) or both 
frowning (condemning). Thus, the study purports to test 
the psychoanalytic proposition that males can unconsciously 
inhibit themselves in competitive performance because win-
ning has the hidden connotation of defeating father for 
mother's love (Beisser, 1961). 
In three of the four experiments, the results ob-
tained were consistent with the expectation that exposure 
to the OK stimuli would enhance subsequent·dart-throwing 
accuracy while the WRONG stimuli would diminish it. The 
authors note that for these three groups, 40 of 78 subjects 
(51 percent) obtained adjusted scores for the OK condition 
that were 100 points greater than their adjusted scores for 
the WRONG condition. In contrast, only one subject had a 
difference of this magnitude in the opposite direction. 
For the experiment which failed to obtain significant re-
sults, uncontrolled illumination levels were blamed. A 
subsequent experiment varied illumination levels and found 
that stimuli exposed at higher levels failed to produce 
effects even though stimuli were then closer to threshold. 
Results from a discrimination task administered to most 
subjects following three of the experiments suggest that 
results cannot be attributed to the availability of supra-
liminal partial cues. 3 
3
·unfortunately, the discrimination task was not 
administered following Experiment I which used a three-
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Silverman and Fishel (Note 4) review research on 
the oedipus complex. They argue that subliminal psycho-
dynamic activation is a way to experimentally stimulate 
oedipal motives without disturbing their status as uncon-
scious mental contents. In their paper, they report two 
unpublished successful replications of the dart study men-
tioned above.4 They cite Lonski and Palumbo (1978) who 
found predicted results for the two BEATING DAD stimuli and 
no effect for stimuli in which the word MOM replaced DAD. 
Silverman and Fishel (Note 4) also report the results of 
Hayden and Silverstein (1978) who obtained predicted ef-
fects for the two BEATING DAD stimuli and for WINNING MOM 
IS OK and WINNING MOM IS WRONG. The stimuli WINNING DAD IS 
OK and NINNING DAD IS WRONG had no effect on dart scores. 
The results of these replication studies are interpreted by 
Silverman and Fishel as evidence that the specifically 
oedipal content of the stimuli was responsible for the 
observed changes in competitive performance. 
Results obtained in a further replication attempt 
(Swanson, Note 1) are in striking contrast to those re-
ported above. Additional information on procedure and 
copies of the stimuli used in the original study were 
field tachistoscope most similar to that used in the 
present study. 
4The present author was unable to acquire the 
original reports of these two studies. 
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obtained from Silverman. Two experimenters used identical 
procedures with a total of 38 subjects.5 Means and stan-
dard deviations for dart scores obtained following the two 
BEATING DAD stimuli and their associated baseline stimuli 
are presented in Table 1. The results of matched-pairs t 
tests computed for these data are presented in Table 2. 
These reveal that the only statistically significant result 
obtained was for the author's subjects following exposures 
to the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus (£ < .01, 2-tailed). 
Dart scores increased significantly here, a finding di-
rectly opposite that of the original study. Fourteen sub-
jects showed increases in dart scores following this stim-
2 
ulus while only four showed decreases <x (1) = 4.55, 
£ < .OS). The co-experimenter obtained no effect with the 
same stimulus. When results from both experimenters are 
combined, neither of the oedipally-related stimuli had a 
significant effect on dart scores. These results clearly 
fail to support Silverman's findings on the effects of sub-
liminal stimulation with these stimuli, and in one instanc~ 
are in the opposite direction of his original findings. 
In the same study, Swanson (Note 1) presented ad-
ditional stimuli designed to investigate which elements of 
the OK and WRONG stimuli are necessary to produce the 
experimental effects. To test whether the specifically 
5Thanks are due to Robert Casas who was the co-
experimenter in this investigation. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and Baseline 
Dart Scores for Swanson (Note 1) 
Author Co-Experimenter Combined 
Stimulus (~=18) (~=20) (n=38) 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Baseline 
M 445.55 461.00 453.68 
SD 89.19 88.67 88.05 
·critical 
M 437.22 468.50 453.68 
so 102.83 108.35 105.53 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Baseline 
M 419.45 458.00 439.74 
SD 120.71 128.42 124.67 
Critical 
M 465.00 451.00 457.63 
SD 92 .. 94 130.34 112.88 
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Table 2 
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for Swanson (Note 1) 
Author Co-Experimenter Combined 
Stimulus <n.=l8) (!!_=20) (!!_=38) 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Mean difference -8.33 7.50 .00 
so of difference 102.97 64.72 84.18 
t 
-
.34 0.52 .00 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
!-lean difference 45.55 -7.00 17.89 
so of difference 65.64 80.20 77.40 
t 2.94* -.39 1.43 
*£ < .01, 2-tailed 
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oedipal elements of the original stimuli are necessary, 
reference to defeating father was eliminated from a further 
set of stimuli (WINNING DARTS IS OK and WINNING DARTS IS 
WRONG with congruous pictures). A further set eliminated 
reference to competition and included only a non-specific 
behavioral injunction (YOU DO OK and YOU DO WRONG with con-
gruous pictures) • In the event, none of these four criti-
cal stimuli had a significant effect on dart scores, al-
though the WINNING DARTS IS OK stimulus approached signifi-
cance (P < .10, 2-tailed). Again, the direction here was 
surprising in that this stimulus led to decreases in dart 
scores. 
This study clearly failed to replicate any part of 
Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig's (1978) demonstration 
of "subliminal psychodynamic activation" with the dart-
throwing paradigm. This was true for both oedipally-
related stimuli and for two experimenters running separate 
groups of subjects. Though slight differences between 
studies can never be completely eliminated, Swanson (Note 
1) found no obvious or straightforward reasons explaining 
the radically different results obtained. He concludes 
that the predicted effect is not "reliable and powerful" as 
described by the original authors (p. 354). Rather, it is 
more probable that the original findings were dependent on 
highly specific and unknown situational, subject, or ex-
perimenter variables. The apparent fragility and inconsis-
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tencies found in subliminal perception results highlight 
the need for careful independent replication. 
The Present Study 
The present investigation includes a further repli-
cation of this study using the two BEATING DAD stimuli in 
the dart paradigm. An additional control group receives 
identical treatment except that the "priming" procedures 
used in the earlier studies are omitted. The results bear 
on Silverman's (1965) assertion regarding the necessity of 
these procedures for normal subjects and on the more gen-
eral issue of the role of drive activation in subliminal 
perception research (e.g., Klein & Holt, 1960). Addi-
tional personality and historical data are collected in 
order to evaluate more systematically the importance of 
subject differences for this paradigm. In particular, sub-
jects are asked about their religious history, as this may 
in part determine personal meanings given to the words 
"ok," "wrong," and "dad." Subjects are also asked the 
words used as children and at present to refer to their 
fathers. Primary meanings associated with several stimulus 
words are also elicited. These data may shed light on the 
relevance of idiosyncratic and associative meanings given 
to stimulus words. Finally, subjects complete the Califor-
nia Personality Inventory in an open-ended exploration of 
identifiable personality differences associated with 
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subliminal effect in the dart paradigm. 
Studies of subliminal perception have often yielded 
weak or ambiguous results and have only rarely been repli-
cated. One possible reason for the apparent fragility of 
subliminal effects is that the stimulus contents used in 
many experiments may be insufficient in their emotional im-
pact and so have negligible effect on primary process or 
non-conscious mental events. In addition, many studies 
have been criticized for employing dependent measures in-
sensitive to the subtle effects of subliminal stimulation 
on peripheral trains of thought (Klein, 1967) . The second 
part of the present investigation addresses itself to these 
.criticisms by including stimuli with highly aggressive con-
tent and employing word association tasks as dependent 
measures. 
For the word association paradigm, subliminally 
presented stimuli include the verbal message DESTROY FATHER 
with associated picture of a younger male attacking an 
older male figure. The (relatively) neutral message PEOPLE 
WALKING with picture of these figures in a peaceful pose is 
also employed. Following exposures to one of these stim-
ulus pairs, subjects associate to their own responses in a 
chaining fashion or respond to a list of 12 stern words read 
by the experimenter. Following Silverman's (1976) theoreti-
cal constructs, it is hypothesized that the highly agres-
sive stimuli will arouse unconscious conflict reflected by 
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disturbances in subjects' associative processes. 
Dependent measures include assessment of the 
quality of relatedness of r·esponse to stem words (Moran, 
1953) • The prediction here is that associations following 
DESTROY FATHER exposures will receive lower relatedness 
scores than those subsequent to exposures of the neutral 
stimulus pair. Similarly, commonality scores (relative 
frequency of a response in a normative population) of asso-
ciations given following aggressive stimulation are pre-
dicted to be lower than those following neutral stimula-
tion. Atypical responses (with lower commonality scores) 
are understood here to reflect underlying associative dis-
turbance (Rapaport, Gill & Shafer, 1945/1968). Finally, 
associations following the two subliminal stimuli are com-
pared for the structural relationship of response to stem 
word. Moran, Mefferd, and Kimble's (1964) idiodynamic set 
categories are employed here. 
In both the word association and dart procedures, 
stimulus order is randomized and the experimenter blind to 
stimulus content. Each subject is also administered a dis-
crimination task using experimental stimuli as a check on 
the availability of supraliminal partial cues. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects for the experiment were 34 males from the 
Loyola University Department of Psychology undergraduate 
volunteer pool. Only subjects who spent their childhoods 
in primarily English speaking homes were included (Silver-
man, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978, p. 346). Subjects who 
wear {untinted) glasses or contact lenses for any reason 
were required to wear them during all tachistoscipic 
presentations (Silverman, Note 3) . Prior to the actual 
experiment, an additional 10 subjects drawn from the same 
population were used for a pilot study described below. 
Subjects' ages ranged from 17 to 21 years with a mean age 
of 18.6 years and a mode age of 18 years. Except for a 
control group of 10 subjects who did not receive "priming" 
procedures, each subject participated in all phases of the 
experiment. 
Materials 
The experimental verbal stimuli for the dart 
paradigm include: (a) BEATING DAD IS WRONG, and (b) BEAT-
ING DAD IS OK. Each is printed in letters 1.3 em high and 
occupies two lines on a white card. The pictorial stimuli 
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are 4 x 7 em line drawings intended to be congruous with 
the verbal messages. Thus, for Stimulus a, the pictoral 
accompaniment consists of a simple line drawing of older 
and younger males figures looking at each other with lips 
turned downward, clearly conveying negative feeling. For 
Stimulus b, the pictorial accompaniment is identical, ex-
cept that the lips are turned up, so that the figures ap-
pear to be smiling at each other. The baseline stimuli 
consist of (relatively) neutral verbal messages and con-
gruous pictures. They include: (a) PEOPLE ARE SITTING, 
and (b) PEOPLE ARE ST&~DING. The stimuli do not appear to 
differ with regard to angularity. How these stimuli were 
generated from photocopies of the stimuli used in the or-
iginal Silverman study will be detailed after other 
materials are discussed. 
As in Experiment I of the original study and 
Swanson (Note 1), the stimuli are viewed through an elec-
tronically controlled Scientific Prototype three-field 
tachistoscope (Model N-1000). The viewing distance is 
1.3 meters. The exposures of verbal message and picture 
(each from different fields) last 4 msec each. For the 
dart paradigm, the tachistoscope is set up so that when 
the subject looks into the eyepiece, he sees the blank 
field with red fixation dot, which goes off each time the 
stimulus fields go on. After the instructions "Ready," 
the picture field is exposed for 4 msec followed by the 
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blank field for 3 seconds followed by the verbal field for 
4 msec followed again by the blank field. Then, with 5 
seconds of the blank field passing after each pair of ex-
posures, this sequence is repeated three times, thus giv-
ing four pairs of exposures for each condition. 
For the dart-throwing competition, an American-
style dart board identical to that used in the original 
study was hung 96 inches from the throwing line with the 
bottom 58 inches from the floor. The dartboard (manu-
factured by General Sportscraft of Bergenfeld, New Jersey) 
is 18 inches in diameter and divided into seven equal con-
centric circles with the following point allotments: 10, 
20, 30, 40,.60, 80, and 100. One defect should be noted. 
Part of the bullseye (the 100 point area) seems to be made 
of hard wood which the metal darts cannot penetrate. Thus, 
darts hitting this area and bouncing away from the board 
were scored as 100 points. The dart-throwing area is 
situated immediately adjacent to subject's seat for view-
ing the tachistoscope (see Appendix A-I, "Room Diagram"). 
Tachistoscopic illumination levels varied across 
the original Silverman experiments and were not reported 
for Experiment I in which a three-field tachistoscope was 
used. Silverman (Note 3) recommends however that the il-
lumination of the stimulus fields be set at between 4 and 
5 footlarnberts with blank field and room illumination two 
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to three times brighter than this. 6 Stimulus field il-
luminations were set at 5.5 footlamberts, and the blank 
field at 13.0 footlamberts. 7 Illumination measurements 
were made using an EG & G Model 450 photometer with ex-
perimental stimulus cards inserted in the fields. All 
fields were set at "constant-on" positions while measure-
ments were made. Silverman (Note 3) also notes that sub-
jects' exposure to glare from room lighting may interfere 
with subliminal registration. For this reason, room 
lighting was shielded from subjects' direct view thereby 
eliminating the possibility that glare from the floures-
cent lighting could effect results. Room illumination was 
measured at 13.5 footlamberts. This measurement was taken 
of the wall which subjects faced when seated at the tach-
istoscope and when throwing darts (see Appendix A-I, 
"Room Diagram"). 
Lack of the original stimuli used in the Silverman 
study made their exact replication in terms of brightness, 
sharpness, and contrast impossible. Swanson (Note 1) care-
fully constructed stimuli from photocopies of original 
6 Experiment II of the original Silverman study 
reports stimulus field illuminations of 5 footlamberts 
with the blank field at 9 footlamberts. Experiment IV 
used stimulus fields at 5 footlamberts with the blank 
field at 15 footlamberts. Both experiments used a two-
field tachistoscope and obtained the predicted effect. 
7 Illumination levels varied no more than 5 percent 
over several measurements made during the course of the 
experiment. 
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stimuli in an effort to replicate ascending threshold 
parameters recommended by Silverman (Note 3). Stimuli 
used by Swanson (Note 1} had mean thresholds of 30.4 msec 
for first report and 46.1 msec for correct reading which 
closely approximated Silverman's recommendations (of 30 
msec and 40 to 60 msec, respectively). 8 Field illurnina-
tion levels identical to those used in the experiment 
proper were used in generating threshold data. Subjects 
were instructed to report everything they saw, whether a 
flash, a line, a letter, or a change in brightness, and 
to report all parts of the stimuli as they were seen. For 
each threshold determination, the subject was given 45 
seconds exposure to the blank field (with fixation dot) , 
told "Ready," and then exposed to the stimulus for 4 msec. 
Each stimulus exposure was followed by 4 seconds of the 
blank field. Stimulus exposure times were increased by 2 
msec increments until the subject first reported a partial 
I 
cue (e.g., a line, a letter} and then in 1 msec increments 
until a correct reading was made. 
8These sti~uli appeared dramatically lighter than 
the ones originally obtained. Copies of two of these 
lightened stimuli and a description of threshold data were 
sent to Silverman. He replied that the stimuli appeared 
no lighter than others he had used in two-field tach-
istoscope experiments. Further, he reminded the author 
that no illumination measurements had been made in Ex-
periment I of the original experiment which used a Sci-
entific Prototype three-field tachistoscope comparable 
to the one used here. This could clearly have accounted 
for the observed differences. 
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More recently, Silverman (Note 3) has recommended 
use of somewhat darker stimuli with consequent lower 
thresholds for correct reading. In an effort to provide 
some data relevant to the question of the relationship be-
tween threshold and subliminal effect, a brief pilot study 
was completed. Additional stimuli were generated by dark-
ening and evening lines on copies of the stimuli used in 
the earlier studies. Ascending threshold data for these 
stimuli was collected in the manner described above for 10 
experimental subjects and 10 pilot subjects drawn from the 
same subject pool. For these 20 subjects, mean threshold 
for first report was 21.4 msec with a range of 8 to 38 
msec. Mean threshold for correct reading was 35.5 msec 
with a range of 14 to 76 msec. 
These stimuli were used with the 10 pilot subjects 
in a replication of the dart paradigm procedures described 
by Swanson (Note 1) . Means and standard deviations for 
these dart scores are presented in Table 3. Results of 
matched-pairs ! tests in Table 4 show a significant in-
crease in dart scores following subliminal exposures to 
the BEATING DAD IS OK stimuli (£ < .OS, 2-tailed). In 
view of these results, the decision was made to employ 
these stimuli and ones of similar darkness in all of the 
experimental procedures which follow. (See Appendix E 
for photocopies of the stimuli used.) 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and 
Baseline Dart Scores for Pilot Subjects 
Stimulus 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Baseline 
Critical 
BEATING DAD tS WRONG 
Baseline 
Critical 
Note. N = 10. 
437.00 
468.00 
438.00 
482.00 
SD 
67.17 
80.11 
99.20 
76.13 
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Table 4 
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for Dart Scores 
Stimulus 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Note. N = 10. 
*E < .05, 2-tailed. 
for Pilot Subjects 
Mean 
Difference 
31.00 
44.00 
SD of 
Difference 
43.06 
108.03 
t 
2.28* 
1.29 
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Procedure for the Dart Paradigm 
A verbatim account of the experimenter's inter-
action with subjects is provided in Appendix A-II. This 
was adapted with only minor variations from the account 
obtained from the original authors. The major steps of 
the procedure are described below. 
When each subject arrived, he was asked by the ex-
perimenter to read an information sheet that explains the 
rudiments of the experiment and assures confidentiality 
(see Appendix A-III). He was then asked to sign a consent 
form. If the form was signed, the subject was told of the 
dart-throwing competition for which cash prizes of $12, $8, 
and $5 would be awarded to the three highest scorers. 
After a brief explanation of the tachistoscope, the subject 
was given the "priming" material identical to that used in 
the original Silverman study and in Swanson (Note 1). This 
consisted of a brief questionnaire (Appendix A-IV) involv-
ing questions about the subject's relationships with his 
mother and father, Rorschach card IV (the "father" card), 
TAT card 7Bt1 (a "father-son" scene), TAT card 6BM (a 
"mother-son" scene), and a story recall task. The later 
involved the subject looking at TAT card 6BM while being 
read a story (Appendix A-V) made up by the original 
authors to contain prominent oedipal elements. He then 
recalled the story and told it back to the experimenter. 
The purpose of these procedures was to "prime" 
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the subjects for the oedipal content to be subliminally 
presented. Silverman (1965) reports that for subliminal 
effects to be obtained for normal subjects, the mental 
content that the stimuli were intended to trigger had to 
be activated by priming beforehand. As a test of this 
hypothesis for the dart paradigm, a "no-priming" control 
group of 10 randomly chosen subjects received all experi-
mental procedures except those just described. 
After two sets of eight practice dart throws,9 
each subject was put through the two conditions of the 
dart paradigm. Each condition consisted of tachisto-
scopic exposure to a baseline stimulus pair and a base-
line assessment of dart-throwing (all eight darts were 
thrown by the subject and then retrieved by the experi-
menter). This was followed by the tachistoscopic presen-
tation of one of the two experimental oedipal stimuli al-
ready described and another eight dart throws. This was 
followed by the other condition, in which pretest and 
posttest assessments of dart-throwing were again collected. 
The sequence of baseline conditions remained fixed for all 
subjects, while order of presentation of the critical 
. 1' d . d 10 st~mu ~ was ran om~ze . 
9To minimize the possibility of a practice effect 
over trials, two sets of practice throws were included 
rather than one set as in the earlier studies. 
lOAll stimulus materials were coded prior to the 
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Materials and Procedures for the Chained and 
D~screte Word Assoc~at~on Paradigms 
Following the replication procedures described 
above, each subject received subliminal exposures to 
either the PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER stimuli and 
was asked for a chain of eight word associations. These 
stimuli were constructed so as to match stimuli used in 
the dart paradigm in terms of line darkness and width, 
contrast, angularity, size, and clarity.ll The critical 
stimuli consisted of the verbal message DESTROY FATHER and 
a simple line drawing of a younger male figure with a 
knife attacking an older male figure. The (relatively) 
neutral stimuli consists of the verbal message PEOPLE 
WALKING and a line drawing of the same younger and older 
male figures positioned next to each other. (See Appendix 
F for photocopies of the stimuli used.) 
For the word association procedures, the tach-
istoscope was set up so that the red fixation dot was on 
when the subject looked into the eyepiece and turned off 
when stimulus exposures began. The duration of stimulus 
experiment and entered into the tachistoscope in such a 
way that the experimenter remained blind to their content. 
In the event the experimenter (or subject) became aware 
of stimulus content, stimulus cards were re-ceded and data 
for that subject were discarded. 
llAscending threshold data discussed earlier re-
vealed small non-significant differences between these 
sets of stimuli in mean thresholds for first report and 
for correct reading. 
68 
field exposures remained at 4 msec. To provide more 
stimulus exposures, each pictorial and stimulus was ex-
posed ten times separated by two seconds of the blank 
field. The red fixation dot re-appeared following the 
last stimulus exposure and served as a visual cue for 
subjects to give associations (see Dixon, 1968). 
An attempt was made to encourage subjects to re-
lax and not inhibit their associations in any way. (See 
Appendix A-II for a verbatim account.) Following sublim-
inal exposures, the red fixation dot re-appeared cueing 
subjects to say whatever word came to mind. This word 
was repeated by the experimenter as a.stem for subject's 
next association. Eight chained associations were _col-
lected in this manner. This procedure was repeated for 
each subject following exposures to the other picture-
message stimulus pair. Thus, each subject gave sets of 
eight chained associations following exposures to both the 
subliminal stimuli. Order of stimulus presentation was 
randomized. 
To obtain discrete word association data, each 
subject was subliminally exposed a second time to either 
the PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER stimuli. Subjects 
then gave associations to a list of 12 stem words read by 
the experimenter. To maximize the possible effect of the 
oedipal/aggressive subliminal stimulation, the list of 
stems contained a mixture of aggressively and oedipally-
69 
related and neutral words. The stern words with their re-
spective sources for normative data used in analysis of 
response commonality are presented in Table 5. The list 
was presented in backwards order to half the subjects to 
insure against any effect of list order. 
Discrimination Task, Debriefing and 
Personality Measures 
Following presentation of the final stimuli and 
subsequent word associations, all subjects completed a 
discrimination task patterned closely after that described 
in the original Silverman study (p. l46) . Each subject 
was given 10 trials in which, under the same conditions 
as existed during the experiment proper, he was asked to 
distinguish the flickers made by one of the picture-message 
units from those made by another. (See Appendix A-VI 
for directions given to subjects.) The two BEATING DAD 
stimuli were presented (in randomized order) to half the 
subjects, while the DESTROY FATHER stimulus pair was pre-
sented with the PEOPLE WALKING pair to remaining sub-
jects. Each set was presented with the same number of ex-
posures and timing as in the experiment proper. 
Next, subjects were told that a report of experi-
mental results, prize money, and a description of the sub-
liminal content would be mailed to them at the end of the 
experiment. They had been requested to leave mailing ad-
dresses on the questionnaire administered earlier. If at 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
a As 
norms 
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Table 5 
Stem Nords Used in Discrete ~"Yord Association 
Task With Source for Normative Data 
Stem Normative Data 
Wish Jenkins {1970) 
House Jenkins (1970) 
Father Rapaport, Gill and Schafer 
{1945/1968) 
Comfort Jenkins {1970) 
Stab Geen and Stenner {Note 5) 
Table Jenkins (1970) 
Walking Keppel and Strand (1970) 
Lose Keppel and Strand (1970) 
Destroy Geen and Stenner (Note 5) 
Street Jenkins (1970) 
Guilt a 
Star Keppel and Strand (1970) 
independent normative data could not be located, 
were generated from the present data. 
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this point, any subject insisted on knowing the content of 
the stimuli, they were revealed and the subject asked to 
keep this information secret. Other questions about the 
experiment were answered and subjects were then encouraged 
to contact the experimenter by phone at any time with any 
further concerns or questions. Subjects were then asked 
to complete a brief questionnaire (Appendix B-I) and the 
California Personality Inventory (CPI). A summary of 
these procedures appears in Table 6. 
Dependent Measures and Data Analysis 
Each subject received four dart scores (two 
critical and two baseline) based on the total of the eight 
darts thrown following each stimulus exposure. The effect 
of the two BEATING DAD stimuli was assessed by subtracting 
from each critical dart score the baseline dart score which 
had immediately preceded it. Matched-pairs t tests were 
computed on the obtained (critical minus baseline) differ-
ence scores. Silverman (personal communication) has raised 
the possibility that the experimental effect obtained in 
the original study may be of a rather short duration. To 
investigate this, matched-pairs t tests were computed for 
the BEATING DAD stimuli using only the first four dart 
throws that followed each baseline and critical stimulus 
exposure. In view of the hazards involved in predicting 
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Table 6 
Summary of Procedure 
1. Introduction and consent form 
2. Priming procedures (except for "no-priming" control 
subjects) 
3. Sixteen practice dart throws 
4. Baseline 1 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE SITTING) 
5. Baseline 1 dart throws (eight throws for each condi-
tion) 
6. Critical 1 stimulation (one of the BEATING DAD 
stimuli) 
7. Critical 1 dart throws 
8. Baseline 2 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE STANDING) 
9. Baseline 2 dart throws 
10. Critical 2 stimulation (remaining BEATING DAD 
sti~uli) 
11. Critical 2 dart throws 
12. Instructions for word association task 
13. Stimulation with PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER 
14. Chained association task 1 
15. Stimulation with stimuli viewed in Step 13 
16. Discrete association task 
17. Stimulation with remaining stimuli (PEOPLE WALKING 
or DESTROY FATHER) 
18. Chained association task 2 
19. Discrimination task 
20. Debriefing 
21. Subject Questionnaire 
22. California Personality Inventory 
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direction of subliminal effects, all tests of significance 
were two-tailed. 
Correlation coefficients were computed for CPI 
scale raw scores with (critical minus baseline) difference 
scores for each stimulus to investigate the relationship 
of personality variables and responsiveness to the sublim-
inal stimuli. Finally, subject questionnaire data on re-
ligion and associations to stimulus words, and discrimina-
tion task performance were related to dart difference 
scores. A measure of overall "responsiveness" in the dart 
paradigm used here was computed by adding the absolute 
value of the difference scores obtained following BEATING 
DAD stimulation. High "responsiveness" scores indicate 
large differences between critical and baseline dart 
scores regardless of their direction. The measure thus 
provides an index of amount of effect for each subject. 
Discrete associations given to the stems listed 
in Table 5 were scored for commonality and idiodynamic set 
(Moran, Mefferd, & Kimble, 1964). Group comparisons were 
indicated as half the subjects were subliminally exposed 
to PEOPLE WALKING and half to DESTROY FATHER. Commonality 
scores consisted of the relative frequency (in percent-
age) which a subject's association had been given as a 
response to that stem in a normative sample. Norms for 
word associations were selected (in so far as possible) 
on the basis of correspondence to the current sample of 
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undergraduate males. Thus, the Jenkins (1970) norms were 
based on a sample of 1,008 introductory psychology stu-
dents. Keppel and Strand (1970) used 186 introductory 
psychology students. Geen and Stenner (Note 5) report 
norms based on a sample of 191 undergraduate males. 
Finally, Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer (1945/1968) obtained 
norms with a sample of 167 "normal college students." 
Comparisons between groups of subjects who viewed the two 
subliminal stimuli included t tests on mean commonality for 
each stem and totalled over stems. An analysis of variance 
of commonality scores by subliminal stimulus, subject group, 
and list order was also computed. 
The idiodynamic set scoring system was developed 
by Moran, Mefferd, and Kimble (1964) in a factor analytic 
study of word associations given by normals and schizo-
phrenics. It has been used in further studies of cogni-
tive structure in schizophrenic groups (e.g., DeWolfe, 
1971). The system involves categorizing the structural 
relationship of response word to stem word. The cate-
gories (with an example) include: (a) synonym (house-
horne), (b) contrast (lose-find), (c) superordinate (table-
furniture), (d) subordinate (street-pavement), (e) logical 
coordinate (table-chiar), (f) functional (stab-knife), and 
(g) predication (house-big). Detailed instructions for 
scoring are presented in Appendix B-III. Judges estab-
lished a level of 93 percent agreement on ratings of 
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individual responses made without knowledge of the sub-
liminal stimulus which had preceded associations. The 
Cohen (1960) coefficient of agreement for nominal scales 
(K) was .91 for interjudge agreement. The frequencies of 
associations in each set category were compared between 
groups exposed to the different subliminal stimuli. 
Each subject generated two sets of eight chained 
word associations (one set following each of the PEOPLE 
WALKING or DESTROY FATHER exposures) • Responses were 
scored using Moran's (1953) five-point scale of quality of 
relatedness of response word to stem word. This scale 
purports to measure disturbance in associative processes 
and was validated as a measure of severity of current 
psychiatric symptoms (Mefferd, Moran, & Kimble, 1960; 
DeWolfe, 1973). Detailed scoring criteria are given in 
Appendix B-II. Examples of responses at each of the five 
scoring levels follow: 
4 light-dark 
3 train-bus 
2 world-sky 
1 book-dog 
0 no response, repetition of stem 
Judges established a level of 90 percent agreement on 
ratings of individual responses with a Cohen (1960) co-
efficient of agreement of .89. 
Two relatedness scores (one per subliminal stim-
ulus) were generated for each subject by summing scores 
for the seven stem-response pairs in each set. Matched-
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pairs t tests were computed for each subject's difference 
score (PEOPLE WALKING score minus DESTROY FATHER score) . 
Comparisons of the frequency of responses falling into 
each of the scoring categories were also completed. Fin-
ally, as an additional test of the possibility that sublim-
inal effects are of short duration, matched-pairs t tests 
were repeated using only the first three stem-response 
pairs in each set of chained associations. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Results for the Dart Paradigm 
Means and standard deviations for dart scores ob-
tained following the two BEATING DAD stimuli and their as-
sociated baseline stimuli are presented in Table 7. Re-
sults are presented separately for the experimental group 
and the control group which did not receive "priming" pro-
cedures. The results of the matched-pairs t tests com-
puted for these data are presented in Table 8. These re-
veal that, of the four tests computed, the only significant 
result was for the "no-priming" control group following 
exposures to the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus (£ < .02, 
2-tailed). Dart scores increased in this instance, a 
finding opposite that of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and 
Lustig (1978) • Nine subjects showed increases in dart 
2 
scores here, while one showed a decrease (X [1] = 4.5, 
E < .05). Results from experimental subjects fail to 
replicate either the findings of Swanson (Note 1) or of 
the original Silverman study. 
As noted earlier, Silverman has raised the pos-
sibility that the experimental effect may be of a rather 
short duration following subliminal stimulation. Table 9 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and 
Stimulus 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Baseline 
M 
so 
Critical 
M 
so 
Baseline Dart Scores 
Experimental 
(_!! = 24) 
466.25 
85.00 
474.58 
58.53 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Baseline 
M 
so 
Critical 
so 
484.58 
78.35 
480.83 
79.56 
Control 
(_!! = 10) 
472.00 
90.04 
473.00 
103.28 
434.00 
73.51 
481.00 
101.15 
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Table 8 
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for Dart Scores 
Stimulus 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Mean difference 
SO of difference 
t 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Mean difference 
so of difference 
t 
*£ < .02, 2-tailed. 
Experimental 
(,!! = 24) 
8.33 
85.04 
0.48 
-3.75 
90.35 
-0.20 
Control 
(,!! = 10) 
1.00 
90.61 
0.03 
47.00 
48.09 
3.09* 
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Critical and Baseline 
Dart Scores Using Only First Four Dart Throws 
Following Each Stimulus Exposure 
Stimulus 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Baseline 
M 
so 
Critical 
M 
so 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Baseline 
M 
so 
Critical 
M 
Experimental 
(!,! = 24) 
222.50 
43.96 
250.42 
40.16 
255.83 
55.94 
238.33 
55.92 
Control 
(!,! = 10) 
228.00 
41.31 
237.00 
62.73 
208.00 
31.90 
222.00 
62.68 
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presents means and standard deviations computed using only 
the first four dart throws in each condition. Table 10 
presents the four matched-pairs t tests computed for these 
data. The only significant result here is an increase in 
dart scores for experimental subjects following the BEATING 
DAD IS OK stimuli (~ < .01, 2-tailed}. This increase was 
evidently not sustained over the entire set of eight dart 
throws (Table 8}. These results contrast with those of 
Swanson (Note 1} who obtained no significant differences 
with either stimulus from analysis of the first four dart 
throws. This isolated result thus offers rather slight 
support for the hypotheses of a short-lived subliminal 
effect in the dart paradigm. 
In an attempt to investigate the relationship be-
tween personality variables and responsiveness to sub-
liminal stimulation in the dart paradigm, Pearson corre-
lation coefficients were computed between subjects' CPI 
scale scores and (critical minus baseline} differences in 
dart scores for each of the BEATING DAD stimuli. These 
are presented in Table 11 for the experimental subjects 
and in Table 12 for the "no-priming" control subjects. 
No significant correlations were obtained for experimental 
subjects while for control subjects, difference scores 
for the NRONG stimuli were negatively associated with CPI 
scores on "Capacity for status" and "Sense of well-being" 
(~ < ;OS}. Of the 72 correlation coefficients computed 
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Table 10 
Matched-Pairs t Test Results Using Only First Four 
Dart Throws Following Each Stimulus Exposure 
Stimulus 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Mean difference 
SD of difference 
t 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Mean difference 
so of difference 
t 
*£ < .01, 2-tailed. 
Experimental 
<!!=24) 
27.92 
46.44 
2.95* 
-17.50 
67.26 
-1.27 
Control 
<!!=10) 
9.00 
56.85 
0.50 
14.00 
54.81 
.81 
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Table 11 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of CPI Scale Scores with 
(Critical Minus Baseline) Difference Scores for the 
BEATING DAD Stimuli for Experimental Subjects 
Scale 
Dominance 
Capacity for status 
Sociability 
Social presence 
Self-acceptance 
Sense of well-being 
Responsibility 
Socialization 
Self-control 
Tolerance 
Good impression 
Communality 
Achievement via conformance 
Achievement via independence 
Intellectual efficiency 
Psychological-mindedness 
Flexibility 
Femininity 
OK Difference 
(!!_ = 24) 
-.253 
-.128 
-.023 
-.012 
-.336 
-.057 
.041 
-.045 
.195 
.139 
.227 
-.128 
.063 
.108 
.237 
.079 
.074 
.018 
NRONG Differ-
ence 
(!!_ = 24) 
.110 
-.037 
.041 
.042 
.135 
-.022 
.054 
.077 
.019 
.108 
-.014 
-.137 
.077 
.110 
.074 
.077 
.317 
-.056 
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Table 12 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of CPI Scale Scores with 
(Critical Minus Baseline) Difference Scores for the 
BEATING DAD Stimuli for Control Subjects 
Scale 
Dominance 
Capacity for status 
Sociability 
Social presence 
Self-acceptance 
Sense of well-being 
Responsibility 
Socialization 
Self-control 
Tolerance 
Good impression 
Communality 
Achievement via conformance 
Achievement via independence 
Intellectual efficiency 
Psychological-mindedness 
Flexibility 
Femininity 
*E. < .05 
OK Difference 
<!l = 10) 
.298 
.030 
-.471 
-.470 
-.258 
-.353 
-.040 
-.031 
-.236 
-.352 
-.195 
.043 
-.313 
-.469 
-.218 
.229 
-.547 
-.295 
WRONG Differ-
ence 
<!l = 10) 
-.392 
-.578* 
-.141 
-.204 
-.099 
-.580* 
-.474 
-.476 
-.312 
-.349 
-.427 
-.314 
-.375 
.009 
-.343 
-.227 
.257 
.477 
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here, only two attained statistical significance. Thus, 
these findings probably constitute a Type I statistical 
error. In any event, the CPI sheds little light on per-
sonality variables as possible mediators of direction and 
extent of subliminal effect in the dart paradigm. 
Data on subjects' religion and associations to stim-
ulus words were related to a measure of overall "responsive-
ness" in the dart paradigm. This measure was computed for 
each subject by adding the absolute value of the difference 
scores (critical minus baseline) obtained following each 
BEATING DAD stimulation. Experimental subjects describing 
the religious preference of their family when they were young 
children as Catholic (£ = 16) were compared to those whose 
preference was described as non-Catholic (£ = 8). Nodiffe~ 
ence in "responsi~eness" to the dart paradigm between these 
groups was found (t [22] = .26, ns.). Comparison of sub-
jects describing their present religious preference as Cath-
olic (£ = 15) with non-Catholics (n = 9) also revealed no 
difference (t [22] = .01, ns.) in "responsiveness." 
Similar analyses were performed comparing subjects 
who refer to their fathers as "dad" with those using some 
other word. As young children, subjects who used "dad" (n = 
12) did not differ in "responsiveness" from subjects (h = 
12) who employed another term (t [22] = -.86, ns.). Divid-
ing subjects according to present use of "dad" (£ = 18) or 
some other word (£ = 6) also failed to reveal any differ-
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ence in "responsiveness" (t [22] = .17, ns.). 
Subjects were also questioned about their first 
thought or image upon seeing the word "beating." Nineteen 
of the 24 experimental subjects picked "strike or hit re-
peatedly" while only one chose "win in competition." This 
result suggests that the stimulus word "beating" connoted 
aggressive rather than competitive activity for the present 
group of subjects. It is not known whether this finding is 
unique to the current sample and so could have been associ-
ated with the lack of effort observed in the competitive 
(dart) situation. This possibility appears unlikely in 
view of the following findings. Subjects also were asked 
to indicate the word that most clearly communicated "defeat-
ing someone in competition." Five subjects chose "beating" 
while nineteen chose some other word such as "defeating" or 
"winning over." Contrary to expectation, subjects who chose 
"beating" obtained slightly lower "responsiveness" scores 
compared to remaining subjects although this did not reach 
statistical significance (t [22] = .83, ns.). In addition, 
answers to these two questions about word choice did not 
significantly differ between the experimental group and the 
"no-priming" control group which did show an effect with 
the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimuli. Thus, it appears that 
for these subjects, conscious associations to these stimu-
lus words are not systematically related to the amount of 
subliminal effect in the dart paradigm. 
87 
Finally, experimental subjects were divided in 
terms of their performance on the discrimination task. 
Subjects correct on from one to four of ten discriminations 
(n = 7) and those correct on from six to nine (~ = 7) did 
not differ in "responsiveness" scores (t [12] = -.01, ns.). 
In summary, results for the expeimental group show 
no effect on dart scores for either BEATING DAD stimulus. 
For the "no-priming" control group, BEATING DAD IS WRONG led 
to increased dart scores, a finding opposite that of Silver-
man, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978). Analyses using the 
first four dart throws in each set found only an increase jn 
dart scores for experimental subjects following BEATING DAD 
IS OK. Of 72 correlations of CPI scale scores with differ-
ence scores for the two stimuli, only bvo attained signifi-
cance and so are viewed as spurious. Subjects' answers to 
inquiries about religious preference, word used to refer to 
their fathers, and conscious associations to stimulus words 
did not systematically relate to a measure of overall "re-
sponsiveness" in the dart paradigm. Accuracy on a stimulus 
discrimination task also appeared unrelated to this measure. 
Results for the Discrete Word 
Assoc~ation Paradigm 
Word associations given to 12 sterns following sub-
liminal exposures to the PEOPLE WALKING or DESTROY FATHER 
stimuli were scored for commonality (percentage of time the 
response was given in a normative sample) and for idiodynamic 
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set (Moran, Mefferd, & Kimble, 1964). Means, standard de-
viations, and t test results for commonality scores compar-
ing experimental subjects who received the different sub-
liminal messages are presented in Table 13. These results 
reveal no differences between groups for 11 of the 12 stem 
words. Only associations given to the stem "lose" differed 
between groups. Here, subjects exposed to the subliminal 
message DESTROY FATHER obtained higher commonality scores 
(more typical responses) than did subjects exposed to PEOPLE 
WALKING. This finding is opposite the predicted direction, 
and in light of the 12 tests computed, may represent a Type 
I error. Summing commonality scores for all stems reveals 
no significant differences between groups (t [22] = -1.00, 
ns.). An additional analysis was performed using a fre-
quency count of associations given by more than 10 percent 
of the normative sample. This also failed to reveal any 
difference between groups exposed to the different sub-
liminal messages (t [22] =-.59, ns.). 
Table 14 presents means, standard deviations, and t 
test results on commonality scores for the 10 "no-priming" 
control subjects. 12 Here, only the stem word "walking" re-
vealed a significant difference in commonality between sub-
ject groups. More common associations were given here by 
12unequal group sizes resulted here from a blind 
receding of the stimulus cards while control subjects were 
being run. 
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Table 13 
Means, Standard Deviations, and t Test Results for Common-
ality Scores Obtained by Experimental Subjects 
Stem Word 
Wish 
M 
so 
House 
M 
so 
Father 
M 
so 
Comfort 
M 
so 
Stab 
M 
so 
Table 
M 
so 
Walking 
M 
so 
Lose 
M 
so 
Destroy 
M 
so 
street 
M 
so 
Guilt 
M 
so 
star 
M 
so 
Total 
M 
so 
*E. < .02 
PEOPLE WALKING 
(!!,=12) 
4.42 
4.81 
3.67 
6.83 
36.58 
36.99 
1.92 
3.18 
15.58 
20.26 
43.08 
42.75 
8.50 
7.76 
5.58 
4.98 
4.17 
7.40 
4.50 
4.17 
3.75 
2.60 
2.92 
4.08 
134.67 
88.66 
DESTROY FATHER 
(!!,=12) 
4.83 
5.06 
9.17 
11.70 
54.33 
31.96 
2.58 
3.03 
4.33 
2.54 
56.67 
40.38 
5.92 
6.99 
12.25 
7.42 
1.17 
.58 
7.42 
6.26 
5.00 
2.66 
3.50 
4.58 
167.17 
69.83 
t 
-
.21 
-1.41 
-1.26 
-
.53 
1.91 
-
.80 
.86 
-2.58* 
1.40 
-1.34 
-1.16 
- .33 
-1.00 
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Table 14 
l-1eans, Standard Deviations, and t Test Results for Common-
ality Scores Obtained by Control Subjects 
PEOPLE WALKING DESTROY FATHER 
ta Stem Word <!!=4) (!!=6) 
Wish 
M 8.75 7.33 .41 
so 5.25 5.43 
House 
M 7.25 5.33 .27 
so 11.84 9.65 
Father 
M 54.50 48.50 .26 
so 35.00 36.41 
Comfort 
M 8.25 1.00 2.94 
SD 4.92 .00 
Stab 
M 14.50 10.67 .28 
so 23.10 18.94 
Tahle 
M 22.50 29.33 -.25 
so 41.02 42.36 
Walking 
M 17.00 3.67 9.96* 
SD .00 3.39 
Lose 
M 16.00 9.67 1.55 
so 5.77 7.12 
DeStroy 
M 1.00 1.50 -1.00 
so .00 1.23 
street 
M 6.25 5.33 .26 
SD 5.50 5.24 
Guilt 
M 5.25 6.00 -.29 
so 4.50 3.29 
Star 
M 1.00 7.33 -2.35 
so .00 6.59 
Total 
M 162.25 135.67 .73 
so 40.78 74.35 
aspss t test for separate variance estimates used in 
view of unequal sample sizes. 
*E.< .01 
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subjects viewing the PEOPLE WALKING stimuli. In view of 
the small number of observations involved in computing this 
statistic, lack of variation for one group's scores, and 
the 11 ~-significant findings, this result is viewed as 
spurious. Summing commonality scores for all stems again 
reveals no difference between the groups (t [8] = .64, ns.). 
Finally, use of frequency counts of associations given by 
greater than 10 percent of the normative sample also failed 
to reveal any difference between these groups exposed to 
different subliminal messages (t [8] = 1.14, ns.). 
Results of a 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of com-
monality scores for both experimental and control groups are 
presented in Table 15. It is clear that no main effects or 
interactions approach significance. The strikingly low F 
values indicate most of the variance lies within rather than 
between groups. Computation of eta2 shows that only 16 per-
cent of the total variance can be explained by the variables 
and their interactions. Clearly, these analyses indicate 
that exposures to the two subliminal stimuli had no differ-
ential effect on the commonality of subsequent word associ-
ations, regardless of subject group or order list was presented. 
Results of the idiodynamic set analysis for experi-
mental subjects are presented in Table 16. Binomial test 
results indicate subjects subliminally exposed to DESTROY 
FATHER gave significantly more Contrast responses and fewer 
Predication responses than subjects exposed to PEOPLE 
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Table 15 
Analysis of Variance of Commonality Scores as a Function 
of Subject Group, Subliminal Stimulus, and List Order 
Source 
Group (G) 
Stimulus (S) 
Order (O) 
G X S 
G X 0 
S X 0 
G X S X 0 
Explained 
Error (within) 
df 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
26 
MS 
236.89 
1,145.79 
1,832.60 
4,048.76 
3,755.27 
13,313.20 
1,136.90 
4,121.39 
5,848.41 
F 
.04 
.20 
.31 
.69 
.64 
2.28 
.19 
.70 
Note. Group refers to experimental or "no priming" 
control group; stimulus refers to PEOPLE WALKING or 
DESTROY FATHER; order refers to list of stem words pre-
sented forwards or backwards. 
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Table 16 
Frequencies and Binomial Test Results for Idiodynamic 
Sets for Experimental Subjects 
PEOPLE DESTROY 
WALKING FATHER 
Set (£=12) (£=12) 
Synonym 4 9 
Contrast 16 31 
Superordinate 9 9 
Subordinate 10 6 
Logical coordinate 30 33 
Functional 26 19 
Predication 10 2 
Unscorable 39 35 
Binomial 
Test 
ns. 
E. < .OS 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
E. < .05 
ns. 
94 
WALKING. Overall comparison of the distributions of as-
sociations given subsequent to the two subliminal stimuli 
is difficult as the data do not meet the assumption of 
independent categories necessary for most statistical 
techniques. One would nonetheless expect the distribu-
tions to have little correlation with each other if the 
associations were differentially distributed. Computation 
of a Spearman rank correlation comparing the two distribu-
tions results in a coefficient of .77. Though no prob-
ability statement may be advanced, this can be compared to 
the value of .74 that would be needed for statistical sig-
nificance at the .OS level. The high coefficient obtained 
thus suggests that the two subliminal stimuli had negli-
gible differential effect on the overall distributions of 
subsequent associations for control subjects. 
Idiodynamic set results for control subjects are 
presented in Table 17. They show no significant differ-
ences between the subliminal stimulus groups for any of 
the eight categories. As above, computation of a Spearman 
rank correlation results in a coefficient of .90. This 
high coefficient again suggests the two subliminal stimuli 
had negligible effect on the overall distributions of as-
sociations for these subjects. 
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Table 17 
Frequencies and Binomial Test Results for Idiodynamic 
Sets for Control Subjects 
PEOPLE DESTROY 
WALKING FATHER Binomial 
Set (!!_=4) (!!_=6) Test 
Synonym 4 6 ns. 
Contrast 9 16 ns. 
Superordinate 4 9 ns. 
Subordinate 0 2 ns. 
Logical coordinate 8 11 ns. 
Functional 12 12 ns. 
Predication 1 3 ns. 
Unscorable 10 13 ns. 
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Results for the Chained Word 
Association Paradigm 
Sets of eight chained word associations were ob-
tained for each subject following subliminal exposures to 
the PEOPLE WALKING and DESTROY FATHER stimuli. Associa-
tions were scored on a five-point scale of relatedness of 
the response word to stem word (Moran, 1953). !1eans, 
standard deviations, and matched-pairs t test results for 
relatedness scores are presented in Table 18. These reveal 
no significant differences in the relatedness of subjects' 
associations given subsequent to the two subliminal stim-
uli. This was the case for both the experimental and "no-
priming" control groups. 
Table 19 presents these results broken down by 
frequency of occurrence at each scored level of related-
ness. Again, binomial tests comparing the distributions 
of these frequencies between the two subliminal stimuli 
show no significant differences for both experimental and 
control groups. 
Following Silverman's hypothesis that subliminal 
effects may be of short duration, this data was analyzed 
using only the first four associations given subsequent 
to subliminal exposures. Summary statistics and matched-
pair t test results for the three relatedness scores thus 
obtained are presented in Table 20. Again, no significant 
differences in relatedness were found between associations 
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Table 18 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Matched Pairs t Test 
Results for Relatedness Scores 
Stimulus 
PEOPLE WALKING 
M 
so 
DESTROY FATHER 
M 
so 
Mean difference 
so of difference 
t 
Experimental 
(.!!,=24) 
17.29 
3.42 
18.04 
2.87 
-.75 
3.51 
-1.05 
Control 
(£=10) 
17.80 
3.71 
16.70 
4.47 
1.10 
2.33 
1.49 
Score 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Table 19 
Frequencies and Binomial Test Results for 
Relatedness Scores 
PEOPLE WALKING DESTROY FATHER 
Experimental Subjects (~=24} 
6 
26 
30 
95 
11 
0 
9 
20 
35 
6 
Control Subjects 
3 
19 
36 
98 
12 
(~=10} 
3 
13 
12 
38 
4 
Binomial 
Test 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
ns. 
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Table 20 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Matched-Pairs t Test 
Results Using Only First Three Relatedness Scores 
Following Each Stimulus Exposure 
Stimulus 
PEOPLE WALKING 
M 
SD 
DESTROY FATHER 
M 
SD 
Hean difference 
SD of difference 
t 
Experimental 
(_!!=24) 
7.25 
1.85 
7.58 
2.00 
-.33 
2.51 
-.65 
Control 
(_!!=10) 
7.50 
1.58 
6.60 
2.76 
.90 
2.33 
1.22 
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given following the two subliminal stimuli. In sum, sub-
liminal exposures to PEOPLE WALKING and DESTROY FATHER ap-
pear to have no differential effect on the relatedness of 
subsequent chained word associations. 
Discrimination Task Results 
Thirty-three of the 34 subjects were given a dis-
crimination task to test for the availability of partial 
13 
stimulus cues. Of the 10 discriminations required, two 
subjects were correct 9 times, two subjects 8 times, three 
subjects 7 times, two subjects 6 times, twelve subjects 5 
times, eight subjects 4 times, two subjects 3 times, one 
subject 2 times, and one subject 1 time. With a minimum 
of 8 correct discriminations comprising a nonchance per-
formance (£ < .OS, 1-tailed), four subjects met this cri-
terion. Though these performances may be chance occur-
rences in a subject group of this size, one cannot com-
pletely rule out the possibility that partial cues were 
available for at least a few subjects. As noted earlier 
however, experimental group subjects correct on from 1 to 
4 discriminations (£=7) and those correct 6 to 9 times 
(£=7) did not differ in .. responsiveness .. scores in the 
dart paradigm (t (12) = -.01 ns.). Thus, even if partial 
cues were available to a few subjects, this appears un-
13
one subject did not complete this task due to 
lack of time. 
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likely to have affected results for at least the dart 
paradigm. 
For the group as a whole, the mean number of cor-
rect discriminations was 5.09 which did not significantly 
differ from the expected 5 correct of 10 discriminations. 
No significant differences were found between performance 
of experimental and control subjects or between use of the 
BEATING DAD or the PEOPLE WALKING/DESTROY FATHER pairs for 
the discrimination task. As the stimuli were presented 
under the same conditions as existed during the experiment 
proper, these results provide little evidence for the 
presence of partial stimulus cues. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Dart Paradigm 
The major conclusion to be drawn from these results 
is that they failed to replicate any part of Silverman, 
Ross, Adler, and Lustig's (1978) demonstration of "sub-
liminal psychodynamic activation" with the dart-throwing 
paradigm. This was true for both oedipally-related stimuli 
with separate experimental and "no-priming" control subject 
groups. The only statistically significant result obtained 
here was for the "no-priming" control group and was a re-
versal of the results obtained in the original Silverman 
study. 
Before discussion of this result, possible explana-
tions for this failure to replicate are considered. These 
include differences in procedure and materials, subject 
groups, or experimenters. Procedurally, every attempt was 
made here to replicate the original study as exactly as 
possible. In both studies for example, the experiment was 
called "Tournament" on subject sign-up forms. The same 
kind of tachistoscope and dart board were used. The intro-
duction and priming stages of the experiments were almost 
identical for the two studies. Durations and frequencies 
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of stimulus exposures were those reported by Silverman. 
Room and stimulus field illuminations were within the range 
of those reported for the original experiments. 14 Further, 
stimulus materials were generated from copies of the origi-
nal stimuli with the help of frequent consultation with 
Silverman. Ascending threshold data collected for the 
stimuli used here met the recommendations of the original 
author. Finally, data collected from the discrimination 
tasks were quite similar and support the absence of partial 
cue availability in both studies. Though slight or non-
obvious differences in equipment and stimuli were nonethe-
less present despite these precautions, it is unclear how 
they might account for the radically different results ob-
tained in the two studies. 
Differences in subject groups are always possible 
and could account for the differing results. Available 
demographic data show that subjects' ages were similar 
(mean age of 18.6 here and 19.3, 19.6, and 19.5 for the 
original experiments). In both studies, all subjects were 
college males and most were from introductory psychology 
classes. Subjects whose native language was not English 
14The present experimenter may in fact have been 
more meticulous than the original authors in specifying the 
methods for obtaining illumination measurements and in 
taking repeated measurements throughout the course of the 
experiment (see METHOD). The original Silverman study does 
not report measurement methods, gives only one illumination 
reading for each experiment, and fails to report any per-
tinent data for one experiment. 
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were excluded. As Loyola University enrolls a large pro-
portion of Catholic students, differences in subjects' 
religion may be considered. For example, religious in-
volvement or history may in part determine meanings given 
to the words "ok" and "wrong." One can further speculate 
that the word "dad" may evoke special meaning for Catholic 
males if it is associated with the more religious "father." 
In the present study however, comparison of subjects de-
scribing their religious preference as Catholic (both cur-
rently and as children) with non-Catholics revealed no dif-
ference in responsiveness to the dart paradigm. 
Similarly, differences in subjects' associations to 
words contained in the subliminally presented messages 
could lead to different effects. Data collected relevant 
to the words "dad" and "beating" indicate subject differ-
ences in use and meaning bore no relation to amount of 
effect in the dart paradigm. Subjects' scores on CPI 
scales also appeared unrelated to effect of either oedi-
pally-related stimuli. It thus appears highly unlikely 
that measurable differences in stimulus word meaning, reli-
gion, or personality could have accounted for the drarnati-
cally different results obtained by the original and 
15 present subject groups. No data are available which 
15 An ordering of experimental subjects' overall 
"responsiveness" scores (see METHOD section) revealed two 
extreme groups of six subjects each. The "high-responsive-
ness" subjects had obtained total dart difference scores of 
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could aid in determining whether the subject groups dif-
fered in other variables possibly related to subliminal 
stimulation effects, e.g., hemisphericity (Sackeim, Packer, 
& Gur, 1977), visual information processing speeds 
(Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, & Mayzner, 1978), state of 
arousal (Dixon, 1971), and level and type of drive-activa-
tion (Klein & Holt, 1960) • 
Finally, differences in the experimenters need be 
considered. Three male experimenters ranging from 20 years 
to early 30s in age obtained the predicted results in the 
original study. In the present study, one male experi-
menter, aged 26, failed to obtain the predicted results. 
Though differences in appearance, manner, or personality 
may have differentiated these experimenters, it is diffi-
cult to understand how they could have systematically af-
fected subjects' responses to stimuli of which the experi-
menters were unaware. Clearly, one can only speculate as 
to how experimenter characteristics interacted with sub-
200 or greater, while the "low-responsiveness" group had 
scores of 60 or less. Post-hoc comparisons of these groups 
found no differences in religious preference, word used to 
refer to father, meaning given to "beating," and discrimin-
ation task performance. Of 18 CPI scales, the "high-
responsiveness" group scored significantly higher on Femi-
ninity and lower on Dominance, Capacity for status, Sense 
of well-being, Communality, and Intellectual efficiency 
(all E < .OS, 2-tailed). Any conclusions drawn from these 
differences must be tempered by the fact that "responsive-
ness" scores were computed without regard to direction of 
dart score (critical minus baseline) differences and so may 
vary with "inconsistency in dart-throwing" rather than 
amount of subliminal effect. 
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liminally presented stimuli to change the unconscious mean-
ing of the situation for subjects. 
The one statistically significant result obtained 
here was for a group of 10 subjects who did not receive 
"priming" procedures. Their results constituted a test of 
Silverman•s (1965) hypothesis that for subliminal effects 
to be obtained for normal subjects, the mental content that 
the stimuli were intended to trigger had to be activated 
by priming beforehand. For this group only, the BEATING 
DAD IS WRONG stimulus led to increased dart scores, a find-
ing in the opposite direction of that found in the original 
Silverman study. In view of the small number of subjects, 
reversal of effect, and possibility of Type I error, this 
finding must be interpreted cautiously. 
Examination of Table 7 reveals mean dart scores 
varying closely around a grand mean of 473.16 with one 
notable exception. This is the mean of 434 for control 
subjects following baseline stimulation associated with 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG. This implies that this critical 
minus baseline difference attained significance due to 
relatively lower scores following the neutral baseline 
stimulation rather than because of higher scores following 
the critical oedipal stimulation. Following Silverman•s 
theoretical notions, it is not clear why subliminal ex-
posures to PEOPLE ARE SITTING and PEOPLE ARE STANDING were 
followed by lowered dart-throwing accuracy. 
107 
One possible explanation involves an order or prac-
tice effect. Post-hoc analysis of control group dart 
scores shows that the six subjects who received BEATING DAD 
IS WRONG in the first position averaged 398.3 following the 
associated baseline stimulation. This compares to a base-
line mean of 487.5 for the four subjects receiving this 
. l . h d . . 16 ll' th b l' st~mu us ~n t e secon pos~t~on. Reca ~ng at ase ~ne 
dart throws always preceded associated critical dart throws 
(see Table 6), this indicates that the unusually low mean 
baseline score associated here with the WRONG stimulus was 
accounted for by the six subjects for whom this was the 
first set of dart throws following stimulus exposures. 
Thus, it may be that a practice effect seen in improvement 
in dart-throwing accuracy from first set of throws to 
second set in these six subjects accounted for the signifi-
cant result observed. The same pattern of scores was ob-
tained for the BEATING DAD IS OK baseline scores thoucfll--
improvements from first to second set for these four sub-
. d~d l d ll . 'f' d'ff 17 Jects • not ea to an avera s~gn~ ~cant ~ erence. 
16 unequal group sizes (thus lack of counterbalancing 
by stimulus order) resulted here from a blind re-ceding of 
the stimulus cards while control subjects were being run. 
l7A similar situation is found in results from the 
10 pilot study subjects. Table 3 shows that both critical 
dart scores are larger than their associated baseline 
scores. Post-hoc analysis by position only (regardless of 
subliminal stimulus) reveals the following means: 415 for 
the first set of throws, 458 for second set, 460 for third, 
and 492 for last set. Here, dart scores clearly increased 
over the four trials independently of stimulus content. Thus, 
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Aside from these post-hoc speculations, it is 
notable that data from the 24 experimental subjects did not 
replicate this result with the WRONG stimuli. This oc-
curred despite random assignment to subject group, use of 
identical materials and the same experimenter. It is un-
clear how the inclusion of priming procedures could have 
cancelled a significant dart score difference for the ex-
perimental group. Post-hoc comparisons of the two subject 
groups revealed no significant differences in religious 
preference, word used to refer to fathers, meaning given to 
"beating," and discrimination task scores. Comparison of 
the 18 CPI scales score also revealed no significant dif-
ferences between groups (See Appendix c for this analysis). 
Though the possibility of unknown subject group or subject-
experimenter interaction effects cannot be completely 
eliminated, the available evidence indicates striking 
similarity between subject groups. 
The preceding discussion makes evident the diffi-
culty of explaining why the effect of the BEATING DAD IS 
WRONG stimulus attained significance for one subject group 
and not for the other, and why its direction was opposite 
that found by Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978). 
None of the possibilities mentioned are compelling for 
the improvements in critical scores relative to their pre-
ceding baseline scores may represent little more than a 
practice effect over trials of dart throws. 
109 
their evidence, logic, or parsimony. Perhaps a more cred-
ible explanation is that the result is due to random error, 
despite having attained statistical significance. That is, 
it may represent a Type I error in which the null bypath-
esis is falsely rejected. In any experiment, the likeli-
hood of a Type I error increases with the number of statis-
tical tests (t tests here) employed. This explanation has 
the value of added parsimony as the results from the two 
subject groups here could then be considered consistent and 
the problem posed by the reversal of effect would be 
eliminated. 
Taken together, the major results of the present 
study and those of Swanson (Note 1) represent four at-
tempts to replicate Silverman's findings with the dart 
paradigm. They involve two experimenters and separate sub-
ject groups of 18, 20, 24, and 10. Of the eight tests of 
the major hypothesis (two stimuli x four subject groups) , 
18 
not one replicated the original findings. The two signif-
icant results obtained constituted reversals of original 
results. In sum, these results constitute a serious chal-
lenge to the generalizability of the original findings and 
the theoretical rationale advanced to explain them. Given 
the care taken to replicate the original study as exactly 
18As noted on p. 107, n. 17. the statistically sig-
nificant result obtained with 10 pilot subjects and the OK 
stimulus most likely represents a practice effect rather 
than a subliminal effect. 
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as possible, they suggest that the findings of Silverman, 
Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978} may have been dependent on 
highly specific and unknown situational, subject, or ex-
perimenter variables. The reversal of effect for one 
stimulus creates doubt regarding Silverman's (1976} as-
sertion that subliminal stimulation can directly activate 
unconscious wishes or conflicts and lead to predictable 
behavioral consequences for at least the dart paradigm. 
These conclusions regarding the lack of generalizability 
of the original findings are further supported by the 
results of a recently published independent replication 
attempt. Despite attempts to maximize the probability of 
replication by varying room illumination, number of ex-
·perimenters, and distance from threshold of the stimuli, 
Heilbrun (1980} found no significant differences in dart 
scores for three separate subject groups. 
Word Association Paradigms 
Results from the word association paradigms are 
striking in their consistent failure to demonstrate 
measurable effects of subliminal stimulation. No signif-
icant differences were found between associations follow-
ing the PEOPLE WALKING and DESTROY FATHER s.ublirninal 
stimulations on three overall measures of response com-
monality, distribution of idiodynamic set frequencies and 
response relatedness. This was true for both discrete and 
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chained associations with the experimental and "no-
priming" control groups. The few isolated instances of 
statistically significant results are considered next. 
Of the 12 sterns used for investigating response 
commonality, only "lose" led to responses differing on 
this measure for experimental subjects. Here, the di-
rection of effect was opposite prediction in that stimu-
lation by DESTROY FATHER led to more common associations. 
This and the fact that this result did not occur for 
control subjects suggest very cautious interpretation. 
Similarly, it is unclear why for control subjects, the 
two subliminal stimuli should differentially effect as-
sociations given to "walking" but not associations to the 
11 other stems. 
Analysis by idiodynamic set revealed that, for the 
experimental group only, exposures to DESTROY FATHER led 
to more associations classified as Contrast with fewer 
classified as Predication. Recalling the hypothesis that 
this aggressive stimulus would produce disturbance in as-
sociative processes, this result is somewhat surprising. 
Moran (1966) presents evidence suggesting that Contrast 
associations represent the highest level in a hierarchical 
ranking of idiodynamic sets in terms of linguistic sophis-
tication, abstraction, and cognitive development. Pre-
dication associations represent the lowest level in this 
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hierarchy. Following these notions, one would predict 
fewer Contrast and ~ Predication responses following 
aggressive stimulation. Thus, the results obtained appear 
difficult to attribute to differential effects of the sub-
liminal stimuli and clearly need replication. 
Finally, relatedness scores for the chained word 
associations did not differ following exposures to the two 
stimuli. Analysis of just the first four associations in 
each set also revealed no differences. This last result 
provides further evidence failing to support the hypoth-
esis that subliminal effects are of very short duration. 
Taken in sum, these results represent failure to 
obtain subliminal effects using word association tasks as 
dependent measures. This occurred despite procedural at-
tempts to maximize the likelihood of a subliminal effect 
by employing emotionally impactful stimuli and increasing 
the frequency of stimulus exposures. 19 These results con-
trast to those reported by Dixon (1956, 1958, 1971) in 
his studies of subliminal effects on word association. 
Both procedures and materials used here were similar to 
those used throughout Silverman's research program. In 
addition, the present relatedness measure resembles the 
"number of deviant responses" measure used in some Silver-
19 rn addition, several of Dixon's (1971) method-
ological criticisms of the two failed replications of his 
work were incorporated into the present procedures. 
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man studies of word associations with schizophrenics 
(e.g., Silverman & Spiro, 1967b). In this light, the 
present results constitute another failure to support 
Silverman's (1976) assertions regarding the predictable 
effects of subliminal stimulation. 
General Considerations 
In sum, the results of this investigation repre-
sent an overall failure to demonstrate measurable ef-
fects of subliminal stimuli. The few statistically sig-
nificant results were usually opposite predicted .direction 
and never obtained for both experimental and "no-priming" 
control groups. Given the large number of statistical 
tests computed, these significant findings were viewed as 
probable Type I errors and stand in need of replication. 
As noted earlier, the only published independent 
replication attempts of Silverman's work (Greenberg, 
1977; Emmelkamp & Straatman, 1976; Heilbrun, 1980) also 
obtained negative results. The continued inability of 
independent investigators to successfully replicate raises 
serious questions as to the strength of the results of 
Silverman's overall research program. Contrary to the 
assertions of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978, 
p. 354), subliminal effects do not appear to be strong and 
reliable even when experimental stimuli, subjects' motiva-
tional state, and type of response measure are {apparently) 
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congruent. As in the 1950s and 1960s, subliminal per-
ception appears to be a fragile and ambiguous phenomena 
that is not easily demonstrable (Eriksen, 1960; Wolitzky 
& Wachtel, 1973). 
In conclusion, possible reasons for the inability 
of researchers to consistently demonstrate subliminal ef-
fects are briefly considered. Within the psychoanalytic 
framework, many studies have been designed from somewhat 
simplistic theoretical notions. Silverman's work (1976), 
for example, appears based on the assumption that a com-
plex verbally coded message can bypass usual defensive 
operations to directly affect significant unconscious 
fantasies or conflicts. This assumption appears to ignore 
the complex nature and purposes attributed to defense 
mechanisms by psychoanalytic theorists (e.g., A. Freud, 
1936/1966). It is also difficult to envision how stim-
ulus content could have such a direct and specific effect 
on unconscious processes. The mechanisms underlying 
translation of a verbal or simple pictorial message into 
something impacting on primary-process or unconscious 
events are given scant attention by Silverman and other 
researchers. This casts doubt on the validity of the 
"subliminal psychodynamic activation" paradigm as a method 
for testing psychoanalytic hypotheses. 
In addition, subjects differ on variables which 
may mediate subliminal effects. For example, rates of 
115 
processing briefly presented verbal information show large 
individual differences (Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, & 
Mayzner, 1978). Similarly, one might expect large in-
dividual differences in the amounts and ways that infor-
mation is processed when presented subliminally. This 
would make difficult the task of establishing stimulus 
parameters for which all (or most) subjects could show 
subliminal effects. Individual differences might also be 
expected in subjects' defensive organization and the con-
tent of unconscious wishes and conflicts. Many attempted 
demonstrations of subliminal effects appear to rest on the 
assumption that particular unconscious contents (e.g., 
oedipal conflict) are common to all subjec.ts. Related to 
this is the psychoanalytic notion that individuals differ 
widely in the ways that unconscious wishes or conflicts 
are consciously experienced and behaviorally expressed 
(Fenichel, 1945}. This may help to explain why subliminal 
effects are difficult to predict for a group of subjects. 
Finally, consideration must be given to the serious 
methodological and theoretical criticisms that have been 
directed towards subliminal perception research in general 
(see REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE} . Numerous authors 
(e.g., Guthrie & Wiener, 1966) have argued that many 
"demonstrations" of subliminal effects have depended on 
methodological artifacts (e.g., partial cue availability). 
Continued failure to replicate previous findings con-
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stitutes the most serious challenge to the concept. 
Clearly, it remains for future research to convincingly 
demonstrate that subliminal perception is a replicable 
phenomenon and a valid construct. 
SUMMARY 
Beginning with Otto Poetzl's (1917/1960) study of 
the role of unnoticed stimuli in dream formation and con-
tinuing with George Klein's (1967) work on peripheral 
trains of thought, many psychoanalytically oriented re-
searchers have viewed subliminal perception as a method 
to study cognitive processes hypothesized to occur out-
side of awareness. Reviews of the many hundreds of re-
ported studies have generally concluded that the effects 
of subliminal stimulation are weak, ambiguous, or non-
existent. In contrast, Lloyd Silverman and associates 
have published over 25 studies consistently reporting sub-
liminal effects for a variety of normal and clinical 
groups (Silverman, 1976) . In the context of investigating 
relationships between particular unconscious conflicts 
and psychopathological behavior, each study involves sub-
liminal exposures to wish or conflict-related and neutral 
. ' 
stimuli followed by assessment of their effect on be-
havior. 
The present investigation included a careful rep-
lication attempt of Silverman's study on the effect of 
oedipally-related stimuli on competitive behavior, i.e., 
dart-throwing accuracy (Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 
117 
118 
1978). The verbal stimuli BEATING DAD IS OK and BEATING 
DAD IS WRONG with associated pictorial stimuli were pre-
sented through a Scientific Prototype three-field tach-
istoscope (Model N-1000) at 4 msec durations. No signif-
icant results were obtained for a group of 24 undergradu-
ate males. For a "no-priming" group of 10 subjects, the 
WRONG stimuli led to a significant increase in dart 
scores (£ < .02, 2-tailed). This was opposite the direc-
tion of Silverman's original findings and may represent 
a "practice effect" over trials. Subjects' religious 
preference, associations to stimulus words, California 
Personality Inventory scale scores, and performance on a 
stimulus discrimination task appeared unrelated to direc-
tion and extent of effect for this paradigm. 
The investigation also addressed two criticisms 
of much subliminal perception research--that stimuli used 
are insufficient in emotional impact and so have negligible 
effect and that dependent measures are insensitive to the 
subtle effects of subliminal stimulation on peripheral 
trains of thought. Subjects were subliminally exposed to 
the more aggressively-charged stimulus DESTROY FATHER with 
picture and to the (relatively} neutral PEOPLE WALKING. 
Subsequent chained and discrete word associations were 
compared on measures of response commonality (relative 
frequency of a response in a normative sample}, quality of 
relatedness of response to stem words (Moran, 1953) and 
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structural relationship of response ~o stem (idiodynamic 
sets of Moran, Mefferd, & Kimble, 1964). No overall 
differences were found on any measure. The few differ-
ences for individual items were often opposite prediction, 
did not obtain for both subject groups, and so were viewed 
as probable Type I errors and in need of replication. 
Along with other failed replication attempts, these 
results constitute a challenge to the generalizability of 
the original Silverman findings and the theoretical ra-
tionale advanced to explain them. They further highlight 
the fragile and ambiguous nature of subliminal perception 
effects in general. 
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I. Room Diagram 
84" 
E stood here 
duri~g dart throws 
r Dart line 
a r 
118" 
96" 
Table with I 
tachistoscope 
a r 
.LJart 
Board 
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II. Details of Experimenter-Subject Interaction 
When S. arrives: I'm Bob Swanson and as you may know from 
the name of th1s experiment, this is a study of factors 
that influence competitive performance. We can begin by 
your reading and signing this information sheet which ex-
plains most of what we'll be doing. {ShowS. information/ 
consent sheet.) I want to re-emphasize that your re-
sponses will be kept in confidence and that you can with-
draw from the experiment at any time without penalty. 
Reassurance about tach: Before we get to the tournament 
part of the exper1ment which will involve throwing darts 
at the dart board up there, I want to explain what this 
equipment is. This is a tachistoscope and it will be used 
in the experiment. It can regulate precisely the amount 
of time a picture or message can be flashed and seen. In 
this experiment we will be flashing messages or pictures 
at a speed of four one-thousands of a second, a speed at 
which you would probably be aware only of a brief flash 
or flicker of light. The messages or pictures should 
register in your mind however, and after the experiment 
you will have an opportunity to find out about the content 
of the stimuli you were shown. Do you wear corrective 
lens for any reason? Do you have any questions about what 
we'll be dolng? 
Questionnaire: Now I would like you to fill out this 
questionnaire. Be sure to include a permanent mailing 
address as I'll be mailing the results to all subjects at 
the end of the study. 
Rorschach Card 4: Now I am going to show you an ink blot, 
and I want you to tell me what you imagine you see. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Different people imagine 
different kinds of things. If you should see more than 
one thing in the card, then tell me everything it looks 
like to you. {Do inquiry for location only and allow no 
more than 8 responses.) 
TAT Card 7 BM: Now I am going to show you a picture, and 
I would like you to make up a story about the picture, 
having a past, present, and a future. (Inquire into out-
come if not spontaneously given. Inquire if an emotional 
description is used that is unclear.) 
TAT Card 6 BM: Now I am going to show you another picture, 
and I would like you to make up a story about the picture, 
having a past, present, and a future. 
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TAT Story (to Card 6 BM) and Recall: Now I am going to 
read you a story we made up for the purpose of this ex-
periment about this picture, and I will ask you to recall 
it back to me after I finish reading it. (Read story.) 
I would like you to recall the story as best you can, and 
tell it back to me. 
Explanation of Tournament: Okay, now we come to the 
tournament. As you can see, the top places so far are 
listed over here. The top three places in the tournament 
will receive cash prizes of $12, $8, and $5. I am going 
to have you throw a total of 32 darts. You will throw 
four series of eight darts, and before each series you 
will sit down and look into the tach. Your grand score, 
every dart, will count in the tournament. Before I give 
you the instructions about that, why don't you step over 
there and throw some practice darts? Stand behind that 
line and throw all eight darts. Make sure you throw them 
hard enough so they stick. If a dart doesn't stick in, or 
if it falls out, your score for that throw will be zero. 
However, if a dart falls out of the bullseye, it will 
count as 100 points. The bullseye is defective. (S. 
throws eight darts. After each series of eight darts, 
return darts to table next to S. Have s. throw a second 
series of eight darts.) 
Tournament Procedure: Now I want you to sit in that chair 
and look into the tach. I will be at the controls over 
here, and I will say "Ready" and then press a button which 
will produce two flickers of light three seconds apart. 
After seeing several flashes you will get up, walk to the 
line, and throw a series of eight darts. Then you will 
sit down and look into the tach again. If you have any 
questions, I'd like you to hold them until the end of the 
experiment, and we can discuss them then. Now, look into 
the tach. Do you see a red dot? Okay, try to focus on 
that. During the time we are doing this part of the ex-
periment, try not to blink, and don't look up from the 
machine. I will show you a set of flashes, wait a few 
seconds, then show you another set. You will see four 
sets of flickers in all. Okay. Ready ... (After first 
two flashes, ask) Did you see any flickers? (After first 
set of flashes, ask) Tell me what you saw. (Then instruct 
S. to just tell you if they don't see any flickers or if 
they see something different. Instruct S. to look into 
viewer while changing stimulus cards. Be sure blank field 
is illuminated.) 
First Association Procedure: (Change ISis on tach.} How 
are you feeling? We're done with the tournament part of 
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the experiment and now we're going to do something dif-
ferent. I'm going to flash some more pictures and messages 
and ask you for some word associations. This time, the 
flickers will be two seconds apart. After several flickers, 
the red dot will come back on. When you see the red dot, 
I want you to say aloud the first word that comes into your 
mind. Following that, I'll repeat the word you said and I 
want you to again say the first word that comes into mind. 
Then I'll say that word and you should give another as-
sociation. Every time I say a word you say aloud the 
first word that comes to mind. Be sure to say single words 
rather than phrases or sentences. During this part of the 
experiment, I want you to relax physically and mentally as 
much as possible. Try not to inhibit or to structure your 
responses in any way. Just relax and say whatever word 
comes to your mind. Do you have any questions about this? 
Okay, I want you to get as comfortable as you can and to 
focus your eyes on the red dot. As soon as the red dot 
comes back on, say aloud whatever word comes to mind. Then 
you'll give associations to words I say. Ready ... 
(Be sure S looks into viewer while giving associations.) 
Second Association Procedure: Okay, that was fine. Now 
I 1m going to flash some more pictures and messages and 
ask you for some more word associations. Thi~ time when 
the red dot comes back on, I'll say a word from this list 
and I want you to say aloud the first word that comes into 
your mind. I'll say twelve different words in all and 
after I say each one, you say the first word that comes 
to mind. Again, I want you to relax as much as you can 
and to try not to inhibit or structure your responses in 
any way. Do you have any questions? Okay, get comfortable 
in the chair and focus your eyes on the red dot. Ready 
Third Association Procedure: (Be sure S. looks into 
viewer while changing stimuli.) Now I'm going to flash 
some more pictures and messages and I want you to say the 
first word that comes to mind as soon as the red dot comes 
back on. Then I'll repeat the word you said and you give 
another association. Then I'll repeat that word and so on. 
This is just like what we did a few minutes earlier. Do 
you understand? If you'll get comfortable and focus on the 
red dot. Ready ... 
Discrimination Task: (See instruction sheet.) 
Debriefing: We are finished now. As I told you at the 
beginning, my interest in this experiment was to see whether 
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your dart throwing and word associations could be ef-
fected by the subliminal messages you were receiving. 
What I plan to do at the end of this experiment is to 
send a letter to all of the subjects and tell you what 
the results of the study were. I will also tell you the 
exact messages that you subliminally received. I would 
prefer to wait until everybody has been run through the 
study before revealing to anyone what the subliminal 
stimuli are. Is that all right with you? (If s. wants 
to know at this time what the stimuli are, show them to 
him and ask him to keep this information secret.) Do you 
have any questions or concerns about the experiment? How 
did you feel during the time you were looking into the 
tach? How do you feel now? If you think of any other 
questions or have any other concerns related to this 
study, feel free to contact me at any time at the phone 
numbers listed on the scheduling card. 
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III. Consent to Participate in Experiment "Tournament" 
There are many things which affect a person's com-
petitive performance. One important group of factors, we 
believe, is the way in which people see, and/or remember 
faint or indistinct experiences. By experimentally study-
ing this group of factors in people involved in competitive 
situations we hope to better understand how performance may 
be hindered or improved. 
If you decide to participate in this study you will 
be asked to throw darts at a dartboard, answer some ques-
tions, make up short stories, and look at quickly flashed 
lights which will be words or pictures. From past experi-
ence with these and similar procedures we expect no ill 
effect to you. Also, we expect to learn a great deal 
about how competitive performance is affected, which, 
hopefully, will be useful one day in helping people in 
various realms of endeavor. 
In the second part of this study, you will be asked 
to look at quickly flashed lights which will be words or 
pictures, and then say the first thought or word that comes 
into your mind. After that, you will be asked to complete 
a personality inventory and answer a brief questionnaire. 
From this, we expect to learn more about the mental 
processes involved in experiencing faint or indistinct 
stimuli. 
You do not have to participate in this study, and 
if you do agree to participate you can still change your 
mind at any time and withdraw from the study. Your deci-
sion will in no way be held against you. This is simply 
a research study. All information will remain strictly 
confidential. 
I have agreed to participate in the experiment 
"Tournament" and hereby give my consent to be a subject. 
The experimenter has explained the procedures of the ex-
periment to me and has described discomforts or incon-
veniences I may be subjected to, if any. I understand 
that my responses will be kept in the strictest of con-
fidence and anonymity. I have the option to withdraw 
from this experiment at any time without penalty and I 
also have the right to request that my responses not be 
used. 
Date Subject's Signature 
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IV. Priming Questionnaire 
Name Age 
------
Address 
----------------------------------------------------
Level of Education G.P.A. Married? Parent? 
------ ---- ----- ----
Father's Occupation _____________ Your Occupational Goal ____ _ 
By circling the appropriate letter please indicate 
to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements 
below. 
a) strongly agree 
b) agree 
c) disagree 
d) strongly disagree 
A. I am a competitive person. 
a b c d 
B. I would rather be "alone, at the top" than part of 
the masses. 
a b c d 
c. I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with 
my mother. 
a b c d 
D. I am close with my mother. 
a b c d 
E. I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with 
my father. 
a b c d 
F. I am close with my father. 
a b c d 
G. It is difficult for me to be assertive with other 
people. 
a b c d 
H. I am prone to feel guilty about things more than most 
people. 
a b c d 
139 
I. Most people would consider my father a success. 
a b c d 
J. I consider my father a success. 
a b c d 
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V. Story for Story Recall (to Card 6 BM) 
(Let S look at card while listening to the story) 
This a mother and her son standing there in a state 
of stunned silence. Just moments before, the father was 
also there, but he has stormed out of the room feeling ex-
tremely angry towards his son. They had had a loud argu-
ment in which the son told his father that he was no longer 
competent to run the family business, that he should retire, 
and that he (the son) should take over. Since the mother 
plays an important role in the running of the business, 
this would give the son an opportunity to fulfill a long-
harbored secret wish of his: to spend more time with her 
and enjoy more often the closeness they've shared in the 
past. In his anger at being criticized by his son, the 
father ostracized the son and threatened to exclude him al-
together from the family business. As he stormed out of 
the room he cautioned: "Just remember who's still the 
father around here." The son is now feeling guilty and 
fears that he may have overstepped his bounds. He is also 
afraid that he has threatened the closeness which he and 
his father often experience together. The mother is torn 
between her love for her husband and her love for her son. 
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VI. Discrimination Task 
"Okay, there's just one more thing we're going to do. I 
have two sets of cards here and I want to see whether you 
can tell them apart when I flash them on at the same speed 
I did during the experiment. Try as hard as you can be-
cause the person who does the best on this will win a $5 
cash prize. I am going to show you four pairs of ex-
posures of one set of slides, which will be followed by 
four pairs of exposures of either the same set or a dif-
ferent set. After the second set of four exposures and 
after each set after that I want you to tell me whether 
you think the set you just saw was the same or different 
than the set right before it. You will be comparing each 
set of exposures to the set you saw right before it. 
Okay, now if you would put your eyes up against the viewer, 
we can get started. During this task, please don't look 
up; keep your eyes focused into the machine. Here's four 
exposures of the first set (exposures). Now I'm going to 
show you four more exposures of either the same or a dif-
ferent set. Just say 'same' or 'different' to indicate 
what you think (exposures) . Now for another four ex-
posures and tell me if they are the same as or different 
than the one you just saw (exposures)." Continue, fol-
lowing the order of trials in column I below. 
"Now we're going to do the same thing with another two 
sets of cards. Here are four exposures of the first set 
(exposures) • Now here are four exposures of another set 
and like before you say 'same' or 'different' (exposures)." 
Follow the order of trials in column II below. 
Give the ten trials in column I utilizing the BEATING DAD 
IS OK and BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimuli pairs. Then give 
the ten trials in column II utilizing the PEOPLE WALK-
ING and DESTROY FATHER stimulus pairs. Be sure to show 
both the verbal and pictorial stimuli for each set or--
exposures. 
N.B. When you put in the same stimulus be sure to pull it 
out of the chamber and put it in again so that S is not 
cued by the sound of what you are doing as to whether the 
next exposures will be "same" or "different." Also, at-
tempt to shield the pictorial stimuli from S's view when 
putting it into the tach. 
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I. Subject Questionnaire 
Name 
---------------------------
Date 
---------------------------
The following questions ask for your immediate emotional 
response to several words. This is not a test of how well 
you can recall dictionary definitions-of words, but rather 
an inquiry into the different ways people understand words 
on an emotional level. Thus, the first image or thought 
that comes to mind upon seeing these words is the best 
answer. Please indicate your choice in the space pro-
vided to the left of each question. If no answer is ap-
plicable, write in your choice next to "Other." All re-
sponses will be kept in strictest confidence. 
1. 
2. 
My first thought or image when I see the word 
HAT is most closely associated with: 
A. Glove 
B. Head 
c. Coat 
D. Baseball 
E. Other 
-----------
My first thought or image when I see the word 
FATHER is most closely associated with: 
A. Priest 
B. Mother 
c. To sire 
D. Dad 
E. Other 
-----------
3. My first thought or image when I see the word 
DAD is most closely associated with: 
A. Priest 
B. Mom 
c. Father 
D. A man 
E. Other 
--------
4. My first thought or image when I see the word 
BEATING is most closely associated with: 
A. Strike or hit repeatedly 
B. Win in competion 
C. Exhaustion or fatigue 
D. Beatniks 
E. Other 
---------
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5. My first thought of image when I see the word 
DESTROY is most closely associated with: 
A. Demolish 
B. Kill 
c. Defeat 
D. Beat 
E. Other _____ _ 
6. Indicate the word that most clearly communi-
cates to you the idea of "defeating someone in 
competiton." 
A. Beating 
B. Winning over 
D. Defeating 
D. Destroying 
E. Whipping or whupping 
F. Other 
------
7. Indicate the word that most emphatically and 
immediately communicates aggression to you. 
A. Annihilate · 
B. Beat 
c. Demolish 
D. Destroy 
E. Kill 
E'. Other 
------
8. Indicate the word that most immediately calls 
to mind the man who raised you. 
A. Dad 
B. Daddy 
C. Father 
D. Pa 
E. Pop 
F. Other 
------
The following questions ask about your religious prefer-
ences and other personal history which may in part deter-
mine responses to various subliminal stimuli. Please in-
dicate your answer as you did above. Again, all responses 
will be kept in strictest confidence. 
9. When I was a young child, the religious prefer-
ence of my family could best be described as: 
A. Catholic 
B. Judaic 
C. Protestant 
D. None 
E. Other 
------
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10. As a young child, my family and I attended re-
ligious services approximately how often? 
A. Three or more times per week 
B. Two times per week 
C. Once per week 
D. Once per month 
E. Only on holidays or for special observances 
F. Rarely or never 
11. Compared to other families, I would rate my 
family's involvement in religion when I was a 
young child as follows: 
1 
not 
involved 
2 3 
average 
4 5 
extremely 
involved 
12. At present, my own religious preference could 
best be described as: 
A. Catholic 
B. Judaic 
C. Protestant 
D. None 
E. Other 
------
13. In the past year, I attended religious serv-
ices approximately how often? 
14. 
A. Three or more times per week 
B. Two times per week 
C. Once per week 
D. Once per month 
E. Only on holidays or for special observances 
F. Rarely or never 
Compared to other people, I would rate my 
oresent involvement in religion as follows: 
1 
not 
involved 
2 3 
average 
4 5 
extremely 
involved 
15. When I was a young child, I used the following 
word to refer to the man who raised me: 
A. Dad 
B. Daddy 
C. Father 
D. Pa 
E. Pop 
F. Other 
------
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16. At present, I use the following word to refer 
to the man who raised me: 
A. Dad 
B. Daddy 
C. Father 
D. Pa 
E. Pop 
F. Other 
-------
Use the back of this sheet to write any reactions or com-
ments to this questionnaire or any other part of the study. 
Thanks. 
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II. Relatedness of the Response Word to Stem Word 
from L. J. Moran (1953) 
Scale Description 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
synonym, antonym, or common 
opposite 
category, example, function, 
or attribute 
sentence completion, word ex-
tension, and other loose re-
lationships, i.e., past tense 
(if not functional relation-
ship) 
a single, apparently unre-
lated word 
multiword, repetition, blank 
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III. Idiodynamic Sets in Word Association 
from L. J. Moran, Roy B. Mefferd, Jr., J. P. Kimble, Jr. 
{ 1964) 
SCORING MANUAL FOR STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
SYNONYM 
A. Response word {R) has exactly the same meaning as the 
stimulus word {S) in one or more ordinary and appro-
priate contexts. 
B. 1. R is a synonym of S if R can be substituted for S 
in some ordinary and appropriate sentence ( .) 
such that { R .) means exactly the same as { s . ) 
2. Sentence frame: .) is equivalent to 
----
s 
( R •) 
C. 1. It is important to note that R need have only one 
equivalent meaning as s in order to be scored as 
a synonym of S. 
2. Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence 
frame fitting. 
3. ( S .) and ( R .) must communicate exactly 
the same meaning. Scorer has considerable license 
in choosing ( .); however, once a given 
( .) is chosen, the interchange of S and R 
must yield exact equivalence. Even subtle generic 
differences in S and R are sufficient to force R 
to be scored elsewhere, i.e., in Superordinate or 
Subordinate. 
Exception: S-R adjective pairs such as "large," 
"enormous"; "large," "huge"; "pretty," "beauti-
ful"; "small," "tiny"; in which one adjective in-
dicates a "greater degree" of the adjectival char-
acteristic denoted by the other are scored as syn-
onyms in spite of their connotative difference. 
Usually the adjective A' denoting "greater degree" 
can be defined in terms of the other adjective A 
by the model, (A' means very A.). 
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D. Priority: 
If R satisfies the requirements for Synonym, R is 
scored under this category in preference to any 
other. 
CONTRAST 
A. R negates or contrasts with the meaning of S in one or 
more ordinary and appropriate contexts. 
B. 1. R and S are in contradistinction if 
stituted for S in some ordinary and 
sentence ( .) such that ( R 
or constrasts with ( S .) 
R can be sub-
appropriate 
• ) negates 
2. Sentence frame: 
with ( R . ) 
s 
----
.) negates or contrasts 
C. 1. S and R are either antonyms or strong contrasts. 
In either case, S and R are commonly used in or-
dinary discourse to denote strong contradistinc-
tion. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for contradistinction is, not both ( s .) 
and ( R .) can be true under the same con-
ditions. 
2. Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence 
frame fitting. 
3. If S and R are contrasts, they usually make sense 
in a sentence in which the phrase "S or R" occurs. 
For example, the pair "hot," "cold" makes sense in 
sentences such as "Is it cold or hot out-doors?" 
D. Priority: over Logical Coordinate. 
1. Contrasts are likely to be confused with logical 
coordinates, since they usually satisfy the cri-
teria for logical coordinates. They are disting-
uished from logical coordinates by the presence 
of a contrasting difference. 
2. As a rule, if S-R are contrasts their sense is 
bi-polar. If S-R are logical coordinates, their 
sense is not bi-polar~ there are usually many 
other R's which could be logical coordinates of 
S. For example, compare "hot," "cold"~ with 
"red," "blue." Note that to "hot" it is dif-
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ficult to give another exact contrast. To "red" 
it is easy to give several words, each of which is 
a logical coordinate. 
SUPERORDINATE 
A. S denotes an immediate member of the class or cate-
gory by R. 
B. 1. R is a superordinate of S if S and R can be sub-
stituted meaningfully in the sentence frame (S 
is a member of the class of R.) and if the 
sentence is non-trivial. 
2. Sentence frames: a. s is a member of the class 
b. s is a kind of R. 
c. s is an example or instance 
of R. 
d. Plural forms of a, b, c. 
R. 
C. 1. The requirement that the valued sentence frame 
must be non-trivial is designed to restrict the 
"logical distance" between S and R. If the valued 
sentence frame is non-trivial, then s is an im-
mediate member of R and is scored under this cate-
gory. For example, "red," "color" could be scored 
under this category since "color" categorizes 
"red" in a non-trivial manner. However, "red," 
"entity" would not be scored under Superordinate 
since the extension of "entity" is so broad that 
it categorizes "red" non-specifically. 
2. Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence 
frame fitting. 
3. By "non-trivial" is meant any word which is com-
monly used in the definition of S to indicate a 
generic class to which R belongs. 
SUBORDINATE 
A. R denotes an immediate member of the class or cate-
gory denoted by S. 
B. 1. R is a subordinate of S if S and R can be sub-
stituted meaningfully in the sentence frame (R 
is a member of the class S.) and if the sentence 
is non-trivial. 
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2. Sentence frames: a. R is a member of the class 
b. R is a kind of s. 
c. R is an example or instance 
of s. 
d. Plural forms of a, b, 
C. 1. Converse of Superordinate. 
2. Permit syntactic modification of S or R for 
sentence frame fitting. 
c. 
s. 
3. By "non-trivial" is meant a term which is commonly 
used in the definition of S to indicate a member 
of the class denoted by s. 
LOGICAL COORDINATE 
A. S and R separately denote immediate members (of equal 
logical order) of the same class or category. 
B. 1. S and R are logical coordinates if S and R can be 
substituted meaningfully in the sentence frame 
(S and Rare members of the class X.) and if a 
value can be assigned to X which makes the sentence 
non-trivial. 
2. Sentence frames: a. S and R are members of the 
class X. 
b. S and R are kinds of X. 
c. S and R are examples or in-
stances of X. 
d. S is a member of the class 
X and R is a member of the 
class X. 
C. 1. The requirement that the valued sentence frame 
must be non-trivial is designed to restrict the 
"logical distance" between S and R and the class 
X. If the valued sentence frame is trivial, then 
S and R are distant members of X, and are not 
scored under th~s category. The intention here is 
to force a selection of a value for X which log-
ically subsumes S and R in a non-trivial manner. 
As a matter of fact, almost any S-R pair could be 
subsumed under some broad, nonspecific categories. 
For example, "water" and "paper" can be cate-
gorized as "substance," but the categorization is 
trivial. However, to categorize "red" and "blue" 
as "colors" is a non-trivial categorization. 
153 
2. Permit syntactic change in S or R for sentence 
frame fitting. 
3. By "non-trivial" is meant any word which is com-
monly used in the definition of S or R to indicate 
a generic class to which S and R belong. 
D. Priority: Yields to Contrast and Functional. 
FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
A. S and R each separately denote entities, processes or 
events between which there is an explicit functional 
relationship. 
B. 1. R is scored under this category if S and R can be 
substituted meaningfully in either the sentence 
frame (SXR.) or (RXS.) where X is any predica-
tional phrase denoting a functional relationship. 
2. Sentence frames: a. S is the (a) cause of R. 
b. S is the (a) manifestation 
of R. 
c. S is the (a) necessary or 
usual condition for the ex-
istence of R. 
d. S is the (a) necessary or 
usual condition for the 
proper functioning, perform-
ance, or accomplishment of R. 
e. S is the (a) necessary or 
usual precondition for the 
use of R. 
f. S uses R. 
g. S is used simultaneously with 
or for R. 
h. S produces R. 
i. The lack of S is the cause 
of • . . (a-h) . 
j. Interchange location of S and 
R in each of the preceding. 
k. Plural forms of each of the 
preceding. 
c. 1. The intention here is to categorize a considerable 
variety of functional relationships. Consider the 
following examples and the sentence frames which 
they satisfy. 
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"lightning," "thunder" 
"fire," "smoke" 
"enjoyment," '~applause" 
"soil," "plants 
"teacher," "pupil" 
"conductor," "orchestra" 
"boat," "water 
"carpenter," "hammer" 
"hammer, " "nail" 
"farmer," "vegetables" 
(a) 
(a) or 
(a) or 
(c} 
(d) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
2. Permit syntactic modifications of S or R for 
sentence frame fitting. 
(b) 
(b) 
3. Note that this category is designed for noun pairs. 
The rule permits syntactic modifications of S or 
R and allows s and R to be converted into corres-
ponding noun forms. However, the syntactic modi-
fication is permitted only in those cases in which 
there is an explicit functional relation between 
S and R and a syntactic change is necessary in 
order that S and R will fit the sentence frames. 
D. Priority: over Logical Coordinate. Some difficulties 
arise in discriminating Function relation from Action 
of or Upon S and Action of or Upon R. Since a syn-
tactic modification of S or R is permitted under Func-
tional, some noun-verb pairs are converted into noun-
noun pairs. The most important factor in deciding to 
convert a noun-verb pair into a noun-noun pair is 
whether or not the verb actually denotes a function of 
that denoted by the noun. If so, the verb should be 
converted to a noun and scored under Functional. 
APPENDIX C 
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CPI Scale Means and t Test Results Comparing 
Experimental and Control Subjects 
Experimental Control 
Scale <n=24 > <n=lO > t 
Dominance 29.13 28.70 .20 
Capacity for status 18.67 19.60 -.63 
Sociability 26.25 25.00 .77 
Social presence 38.21 36.80 .60 
Self-acceptance 23.25 23.30 -.03 
Sense of well-being 31.29 32.60 -.53 
Responsibility 25.63 24.90 .46 
Socialization 33.50 34.50 -.47 
Self-control 22.33 23.90 -.60 
Tolerance 18.58 19.00 -.22 
Good impression 14.50 15.50 -.63 
Communality 23.29 25.00 -1.11 
Achievement via conformance 25.29 25.20 .OS 
Achievement via independence 17.50 19.30 -1.02 
Intellectual efficiency 36.21 36.10 .04 
Psychological-mindedness 11.21 12.60 -1.31 
Flexibility 10.54 11.20 -.40 
Femininity 16.46 17.40 -.79 
APPENDIX D 
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Ethical Considerations Relevant to the Present Investigation 
--submitted by the author in October, 1979 to the Institu-
tional Review Board of Loyola University. 
Beginning with McGinnies' (1949) report that taboo 
words had elevated recognition thresholds compared to other 
words, many psychoanalytically-oriented researchers hoped 
that subliminal perception would serve as a method to study 
cognitive processes hypothesized to occur outside of 
awareness. Reviews of the many hundreds of studies con-
ducted in the past 30 years have generally concluded that 
the effects of subliminal stimulation are weak, ambiguous, 
or non-existent (e.g., Eriksen, 1960; Dixon, 1971; Wo-
litzky & Wachtel, 1973). In contrast to these findings, 
Lloyd Silverman and his associates at New York University 
have published over 25 studies (summarized in Silverman, 
1976) reporting slight subliminal effects for a variety of 
normal and clinical groups. Each study involves tachis-
toscopic presentations of emotionally-relevant and neutral 
verbal and pictorial stimuli at levels below conscious 
recognition followed by some assessment of their effect on 
behavior. Given the complexity of the stimuli used and 
the wide range of behavioral effects reported, these re-
sults are quite provocative as they are not easily ex-
plained by most current theories of visual information 
processing (e.g., Neisser, 1967). 
Despite a prodigious outpouring of supportive 
research from Silverman's laboratory, the few independent 
replications of his work found in the literature failed to 
obtain predicted results (Greenberg, 1977; Ernrnelkamp & 
Straatman, 1976). The strength of the results of Silver-
man's research program can also be questioned on method-
ological grounds (Swanson, Note 1). In an attempt to en-
courage further replication, Silverman, Ross, Adler, and 
Lustig (1978) report results of four experiments using a 
relatively simple methodology and college males as sub-
jects. The study investigated the effect of subliminal 
presentation of oedipally-related stimuli on subsequent 
competitive performance (in dart-throwing). In an at-
tempted replication with more stringent experimental con-
trols, Swanson (Note 1) obtained results quite different 
from those of the original study. For this author, ex-
posure to the BEATING DAD IS OK verbal and pictorial 
stimuli led to no significant change in subjects' dart 
scores, while exposure to BEATING DAD IS WRONG led to 
significant increases in dart scores, a finding in the 
opposite direction of that obtained by the original 
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authors. In addition, a second experimenter obtained no 
significant effects with either stimulus. These results 
raise more doubts about the strength and reliability of 
subliminal effects. 
The present study proposes a further replication 
and extension of these findings. Subjects participate 
individually and are drawn from the Loyola Psychology 
Department subject pool. Following an explanation of 
procedures and signing of an information/consent form 
(attached here), each subject is given "priming" material 
identical to that used in the earlier studies. This in-
cludes a brief questionnaire (attached here), a Rorschach 
card, two TAT stories, and a story recall task. Subjects 
then view oedipally-related and neutral stimuli presented 
through a tachistoscope. Stimulus exposure times are so 
brief (4 msec) and illumination levels are set in such a 
way that subjects report seeing only a brief flash or 
flicker of light. The effects of these exposures are 
measured by subsequent performance in dart-throwing and by 
a brief association task where subjects are asked to say 
the first word that comes to mind in response to words 
spoken by the experimenter. The stimuli to be presented 
include brief verbal statements and very simple line 
drawings associated with each statement. The verbal 
statements inciude: PEOPLE ARE SITTING, PEOPLE ARE STAND-
ING, BEATING DAD IS OK, BEATING DAD IS WRONG, DESTROY 
FATHER, and PEOPLE WALKING. Copies of these stimuli and 
other information are available on request. 
In order to clarify the meaning of the differ-
ences in results obtained in the two studies mentioned 
above, several subject variables will also be investi-
gated. Subjects will be asked to complete the California 
Personality Inventory and respond to a questionnaire 
(attached here) inquiring into idiosyncratic meanings 
given to stimulus words and religious history. Debrief-
ing procedures follow. The results will bear on issues 
in visual information processing, subliminal perception 
research, and psychoanalytic personality research. 
In evaluating the potential risks of these pro-
cedures, it is important to note that many hundreds of 
subliminal perception studies and reviews ha~;e been pub-
lished in the past 30 years. To this author's knowledge, 
not a single incident of ill-effect to any subject has 
ever been reported. This includes numerous studies in 
which the stimuli presented were clearly of a more emo-
tionally-charged nature than those of the present study. 
A few examples follow. Klein, Spence, Holt, and Goure-
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vitch (1958) subliminally presented realistic drawings of 
male and female genitalia. Along these same lines, a 
study by O'Grady (1977) included subliminal presentations 
of photographs of explicit emotionally-charged sexual 
scenes clipped from sources such as Juicy Jugs (March, 
1975) and Studies in Danish Homosexual Porno ra h (1970). 
Eagle (1959 presente graph~c p~ctures of a young man 
stabbing a bleeding older man. Verbal stimuli presented 
subliminally by Tyrer, Lewis, and Lee (1978) included the 
following words: cancer, death, coffin, V.D., guilt, 
mutilate, and plague. Finally, Silverman (1976, 1977) 
reports studies with normals and schizophrenics involving 
subliminal presentations of verbal and associated pictorial 
stimuli including: CANNIBAL EATS PERSON, DESTROY MOTHER, 
MURDERER STABS VICTIM and FUCK MOMMY. These are only a 
few examples of the many studies in which subjects have 
subliminally viewed highly emotionally-charged stimuli. 
No incidents of ill-effect for any subject have been re-
ported in the literature. 
Despite a few recent popular accounts of "sub-
liminal advertising" and public concern about this in the 
1950s, scholarly reviews have consistently found the ef-
fects of subliminal stimulation to be weak, of short dura-
tion, and usually non-replicable (Adams, 1957; McConnell, 
Cutler & McNeil, 1958; Bevan, 1964; Wolitsky & Wachtel, 
1973; Swanson, Note 1). Current research (including the 
present study) continues to focus on demonstrating any 
observable effect, no matter how small, temporary, and 
indirect. Even researchers who more readily accept the 
existence of the phenomenon (Silverman, 1976) note that 
the effects rarely last for more than a few minutes. 
This conclusion is based on results of studies such as 
Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) and Swanson 
(Note 1) in which experimental stimulation precedes con-
trol stimulation by only a minute or two. Here, no 
residual effect from the experimental stimulation is ob-
served in assessments immediately following the control 
stimulation. 
Though the possibility of risk to any subject ap-
pears highly unlikely, several safeguards are built into 
the present study. Following a brief verbal introduction 
by the experimenter, each subject reads an information/ 
consent form (attached here) describing the rudiments and 
rationale of the experimental procedures. The experi-
menter again explains that stimuli will be presented be-
low levels of recognition and reassures the subject as to 
confidentiality and his option to withdraw at any time 
while still receiving credit for his participation. 
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Subjects are told they will have a chance to examine the 
stimuli at the end of the experiment. The experimenter 
than encourages the subject to voice any questions or con-
cerns before beginning the "priming" procedures. These 
procedures include subjects' responses to TAT and Rorschach 
cards. The responses are used by the experimenter (who 
has five years of diagnostic and therapeutic training and 
experience) as an informal means to screen out any ob-
viously disturbed or anxious subjects before they view 
any stimuli.l 
During the actual stimulation procedures, the ex-
perimenter closely observes the subject. In the unlikely 
event that any signs of distress are noted or if any sub-
ject voices concern or dissatisfaction, experimental pro-
cedures would be stopped immediately. The experimenter 
would then discuss these concerns and completely debrief 
the subject as to procedures and show him the stimuli. 
No subject would be allowed to leave until all signs of 
distress and concern had dissipated. Arrangements for 
follow-up contact with ·the experimenter would be made. 
As an added precaution against any delayed or lingering 
effects, it should be noted that subjects remain with the 
experimenter for about one-half hour following the last 
stimulus exposures. At the end of the session, each sub-
ject is asked to share how he felt during the experiment 
and to discuss any questions or concerns.2 Any subject 
who wishes to see the stimuli is allowed to at this point. 
In any event, subjects have the experimenter's phone 
number and are encouraged to call with any questions or 
concerns that may arise. 
Given evidence from 30 years research and safe-
guards included in the present study, the author believes 
that these procedures pose no risk for any subject. The 
benefits of the study can be discussed on three levels. 
First, most subjects in the similar Swanson (Note 1) study 
reported enjoying the experimental procedures and being 
1Though numerous studies {Silverman, 1976) have 
been carried out with various emotionally disturbed 
groups without reported incident, the author is concerned 
about how some subjects might interpret the experimental 
procedures and so views this as an added precaution. Two 
subjects were excluded on this basis in the earlier study 
(Swanson, Note 1) . 
2In the Swanson (Note 1) study, no subject re-
ported experiencing discomfort or distress (other than 
occasional eye strain) while viewing stimuli. 
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quite fascinated by the hypotheses tested. Second, the 
results of the study will bear directly on several im-
portant theoretical issues. The notion of subliminal per-
ception has had a long history of research and unusually 
vigorous debate due primarily to the challenge it poses to 
basic assumptions about human perception (Dixon, 1971) • 
As noted earlier, Silverman's (1976) results are especi-
ally provocative for most current theories of visual in-
formation processing. Additionally, the current study 
provides a partial test of some psychoanalytic proposi-
tions regarding cognitive processes assumed to operate 
outside of awareness. Thirdly, Silverman (Note 2) has 
speculated on the practical usefulness of subliminal 
stimulation for psychotherapeutic purposes. 
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